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I. DIVIDED JUSTICES, DIFFICULT DOCTRINE, AND THE DIFFICULTIES IN
DEMARCATING SUBSTANCE, PROCEDURE, AND DEGREE OF DEFERENCE
TO STATE LAWMAKING
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance
Company,' the United States Supreme Court issued its most significant
Erie opinion2 of the relatively young twenty-first century, one seemingly
in tension with its prior most recent major pronouncement on the subject
in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.3  Both cases involved New
York civil rules ostensibly conflicting with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In Gasperini, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) which governs
judicial review of monetary awards trumped Federal Rule 59 (new trial),
while in Shady Grove, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) failed to dislodge Federal
Rule 23 governing class actions-a seeming inconsistency.
The Gasperini-Shady Grove divide also featured a "clash of the
titans" division of the Court as well in that Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's more functional approach, arguably too solicitous of state
1. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
2. By "Erie opinion," I refer to court decisions facing the issue of whether in a case in
federal court on which state law provides the rule of decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1652, the
court is to apply federal procedural rules or state law, which may be embodied in either a state
statute or procedural rule. The body of law stems from the Court's decision in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that where a federal court has jurisdiction founded on
diversity of citizenship per 28 U.S.C. § 1332 state law should be applied rather than any "general
federal common law," thus reversing nearly a century of jurisprudence dating from Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See generally STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINow, MARK S.
BRODIN & THOMAS 0. MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, & CONTEXT 817-64 (3d
ed. 2008) (devoting entire, albeit relatively short chapter of first-year civil procedure casebook to
Erie issues). See also LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 5 (4th ed.
2009); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§
2.35-2.39 (5th ed. 2001); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 54-60 (4th
ed. 1983).
3. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
4. I use the term "ostensibly" with some hesitation because it seems like unnecessary
hedging, but I want to try to be accurate in describing the Erie doctrine. Where a federal procedural
rule and a state substantive law (whether denominated as a substantive statute or imbedded in a state
procedural rule) directly conflict, the court appears to agree that the state law or rule must yield.
Often, the means of resolving the issue is a finding that the federal and state provisions are not in
direct conflict and that a federal rule override of the state provision is therefore not necessary. See,
e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), (FED. R. Civ. P. 3, which states that federal
action is commenced by filing of complaint, not in direct conflict with Oklahoma statute of
limitations requiring that action be commenced by service upon defendant within two years of tort
injury; Rule 3 deemed to govern only issues of timing within the federal procedural system, rather
than an expression of federal policy regarding timely commencement of actions for purposes of
state limitations periods); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)
(same as to ostensible federal procedural conflict with Kansas law).
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law, prevailed in Gasperini 5 only to be relegated to a dissent in Shady
Grove. By contrast, Gasperini dissenter Justice Antonin Scalia emerged
victorious6 in a more formalist, perhaps overly federal court-
empowering plurality opinion reminiscent of Chief Justice Earl Warren's
Hanna v. Plumer majority opinion. Critics might term the Scalia
plurality in Shady Grove as "Hanna on steroids" (or at least a pumped-
5. Compare Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418 (Ginsburg, J., delivering opinion of the court, joined
by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and Stephen Breyer) with id at
448 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas) and id. at
439 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia).
6. Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice John
Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor (except as to Part II.C. of plurality
opinion) with id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen
Breyer and Samuel Alito); id. at 1448 (Steven, J., concurring).
7. "Under a formalist regime, the law is seen as a series of first principles laid down for
application by society to recurring disputes or problems. Lawyers and judges are to reason
deductively, from the general rules to specific conclusions, using the first principles in order to
decide particular cases." See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
143 (1994).
Formalism is distinct from instrumentalism, which is sometimes called functionalism.
Formalism attempts to apply rules through classification of the instant case under a
general rule or principle and rigorous, deductive application of the selected rule for
decision. Instrumentalist adjudication does not disregard the governing rule but
application of the rule may be modified if strict application would undermine or fail to
further the function intended to be achieved by the rule or the legal system of which it is
a part.
Id. at 145.
Applied to Shady Grove and the Erie doctrine, Justice Scalia is a formalist in that he
embraces a rule or set of rules (e.g., apply federal procedural rules in federal court diversity cases if
there is an applicable federal rule) while Justice Ginsburg is a functionalist in that she devotes
greater attention to furthering the public policy goals underlying a doctrine (e.g., avoid differing
outcomes in state and federal court and discourage federal-state forum shopping) even if at first
glance a broad application of the general rule (apply federal procedure in federal court) would
appear to end the inquiry. As discussed below, broad application of the rule does not end the
inquiry for Justice Ginsburg because she is concerned that a state procedural rule conflicting with
the federal rule may in fact embody a state public policy and that failure to apply the state rule will
lead to disparate results and increased forum shopping. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
To state the differences between formalism and functionalism is almost itself enough to
indicate why functionalism has greater support among legal scholars (see infra note 22 and
accompanying text). Functionalism just sounds more sophisticated and reasonable while formalism
seems mechanical and capable of negative unintended consequences. But as demonstrated by
Shady Grove itself and the derivation of the New York rule at issue, formalism can have advantages
not only of greater simplicity, consistency, and predictability but can also achieve equal or better
policy outcomes while reducing the risk that functionalist judges will unduly elevate misguided, ill-
thought special interest legislation to the level of important state policy.
8. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (where Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is validly promulgated
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1934), it controls where on-point and actually
regulating procedural matters rather than constituting substantive law exceeding the scope of
judicial authority to promulgate rules pursuant to the Enabling Act.). See infra note 12 and
accompanying text (discussing Hanna and Warren/Scalia approach to Erie).
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up Hanna) in its aggressive view that federal procedural rules eject
contrary state procedural codes, even where they embody substantive
state law or policy, so long as the federal rule is actually procedural and
on point.
But Shady Grove lifted Federal Rule 23 over its state counterpart
only with the support of Justice John Paul Stevens who provided the
crucial fifth vote regarding the case holding.10 Further, Justice Stevens's
support and Justice Scalia's reaction to it had a "with friends like this,
who needs enemies?" tone in that both Justices took strong issue with
each other's Erie jurisprudence. Justice Stevens used a functionalism
reminiscent of Justice John Harlan,12 an approach somewhat less
deferential to state law than the functionalism of Justice Ginsburg that
arguably walked in the footsteps of Justice Felix Frankfurter.13  Justice
Sonia Sotomayor declined to join that portion of the plurality opinion.14
9. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing plurality, dissent, and
concurrence in Shady Grove).
10. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Steven, J., concurring).
11. Compare id. at 1444-47 (in Part II.C. of the opinion, Justice Scalia engages in extensive
criticism of Justices Stevens's approach to case) with id. at 1448-60 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with much of Scalia's approach; accepting some of Justice Ginsburg's basic
fundamentalist analysis but disagreeing as to its application).
12. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) (agreeing with Chief Justice Earl
Warren's opinion as to holding on the merits but taking issue with Warren's approach as too
formulaic and insufficiently appreciative of potentially serious state interests that might be
undermined by Warren's approach).
13. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter
enunciates "outcome determinative" test for Erie issues, which asks whether application of federal
procedural rule would provide different outcome in federal court than would obtain in state court. If
so, Erie commands application of the state rule to avoid different outcomes and encouragement or
undue tolerance of forum shopping).
In Hanna, 380 U.S. 460, the Court embarked on a two-track approach to Erie questions:
one for cases where a Federal Civil Rule is directly on point (the approach used in Hanna) and one a
for other conflicts of federal practice and state law, in which the York outcome determinative test
still governs. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at ch. 5; JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, §§
2.35-2.39; WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 54-60.
Justices Harlan and Stevens, while accepting the tests in general urged more judicial
reflection on whether any difference in outcome would significantly intrude upon state lawmaking
prerogatives. If not, they were inclined to defer to the federal approach so long as the conflict fell
within the ambit of a federal procedural rule, even at the cost of some federal-state differences in
outcome and some potential for forum shopping. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Whereas the unadulterated outcome
and forum-shopping tests may err too far toward honoring state rules, I submit that the Court's
'arguably procedural, ergo constitutional' test moves too fast and far in the other direction")
(emphasis in original).
Justice Ginsburg might be offended at the suggestion that her approach to Erie issues is as
robotic as York's outcome determinative test, which has been criticized for attempting to turn
federal judges into "ventriloquist's dummies." See Daniel J. Meador, Transformation of the
American Judiciary, 46 ALA. L. REv. 763, 765 (1995) (quoting Second Circuit Judge, Yale Law
910 AKRON LAw REVIEW [44:907
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Shady Grove was also a wonderful departure from the Court's
seemingly predictable ideological divide that has characterized other
close cases in recent years. The majority upholding Federal Rule 23
included conservatives Scalia, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Clarence Thomas combined with liberals Sotomayor and Stevens while
the dissenters attempting to privilege the state law were liberals
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer joined by conservatives Anthony Kennedy
and Samuel Alito.' 5  The division of the Court cut against type, which
both illustrated the difficulty of Erie issues and provided a bit of
reassurance that case outcomes are not completely predictable according
to the Justices' overall ideology or outcome preferences. The
conservative-led majority permitted the plaintiff considerably more
leverage over a large commercial defendant than it would have obtained
under state law, a result opposed by the liberal-led dissenters.
With Stevens's departure from the Court and replacement with
Justice Elena Kagan, one can hardly be confident that Shady Grove
would come out the same way were it reargued today. And although
Shady Grove will surely enjoy the stare decisis accorded Erie decisions,
even when their underlying rationale appears to have shifted,16 the
Justices' divisions over approaches to Erie questions leaves litigants,
Dean, and 1938 Federal Civil Rules Reporter Charles E. Clark to this effect). See also Richardson
v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (expression of similar sentiments by Second Circuit
Judge and former Yale Law professor Jerome Frank). Certainly, Justice Ginsburg's Shady Grove
dissent and Gasperini majority opinion are less rote in focusing on outcome difference. But like
Justice Frankfurter's approach, Justice Ginsburg's approach is highly deferential to state law,
perhaps unwisely and naively so, as discussed in Part II, infra.
14. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435 (Part II.C. of Scalia opinion criticizing Justice
Stevens concurrence and rationale joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence
Thomas; Justice Sotomayor, who joined the rest of the Scalia opinion, declined to join Part II.C.). It
appears, at least to me, that Justice Sotomayor must have declined to join Part II.C. of the Scalia
opinion because of disagreement with the strong formalism favoring federal procedural rules or
because she may have seen it as too much of an on Justice Stevens, or both. See infra note 88-94
and accompanying text (noting that Scalia plurality and Stevens concurrence were at times sharply
critical of one another).
15. See infra Part II, discussing Shady Grove opinions and Court division.
16. For example, after Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), many questioned the
continued vitality of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). See, e.g., John J.
McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer, The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 U. PA. L. REV. 884 (1966); see
also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 374, 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that Ragan "if still good law"
would have counseled a different outcome in Hanna; suggesting that Ragan was wrongly decided
and Hanna was rightly decided, but for reasons different than given in Hanna majority opinion).
But despite the arguable inconsistency between Hanna's federal-rule-trumps-contrary-state-practice
approach, the Court in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) reaffirmed Ragan,
refusing to read FED. R. Ctv. P. 3 sufficiently broadly to conflict with state procedural law
measuring the running of the statute of limitations according to whether a complaint against the
defendant was served within the applicable time period rather than merely filed in federal court.
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lawyers, and policymakers uncertain as to precisely when their state
laws will or will not displace a federal civil rule in federal court.
In the few months since its issuance, a good deal has been written
about Shady Grove, with more surely to come in a mix of criticism and
praise. Some have reservations about the straight-ahead formalism of
the Scalia plurality opinion and its revival-cum-enshrinement of Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., Inc. and argue it is too crude a blade for engraving
the boundaries of the Erie doctrinel 9 while others see considerable
17. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) (finding Shady Grove correctly decided but criticizing methodology and orientation of all
opinions in case. Rather, "[a] single principle - apply state-court rules only when they affect the ex
ante expected value of a claim in a costless and outcome-neutral procedural world"); Adam N.
Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act after Shady Grove, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); W. Daniel "Dee" Miles, II, Shady Grove v. Allstate: An
Erie Sequel(?) and its Effects Moving Forward, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CLE MATERIALS (July 15-16, 2010) (Shady Grove "has grabbed the attention of both
litigators and intellectuals alike. The opinion may either create confusion, consternation, or
celebration among the legal community, but certainly gives a 21st Century flavor to the Erie
doctrine and the line of cases which have developed and the result on class action litigation going
forward." (footnote omitted)); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Why the Supreme Court Should Stop
Freelancing and Go Back to Drawing Lines Between Substance and Procedure (2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/jennifer-hendricks/10 (criticizing Ginsburg's approach in Gasperini and
advocating greater use of Scalia's plurality approach in Shady Grove for future Erie cases); Andrew
J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Forum Shopping, 33 EMPL. PRAC. UPDATE, No. 1 (June 2010)
(criticizing Shady Grove due to its expansion of opportunities for federal-state forum shopping).
See also Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class Actions, 32
CAMPBELL L. REV. 285 (2010) (generally approving of the trial court and Second Circuit decisions
in Shady Grove on grounds similar to Ginsburg dissent in Shady Grove); Armando Gustavo
Hernandez, The Head-On Collision of Gasperini and the Derailment of Erie: Exposing the Futility
of the Accommodation Doctrine (2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1510890 (apparently
writing prior to Shady Grove; criticizing Gasperini approach and urging more direct, simplified Erie
jurisprudence more akin to Scalia plurality opinion in Shady Grove); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic
Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming May 2011).
18. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). See infra note 32 & 72 and
accompanying text (discussing Sibbach and its place in Scalia plurality opinion in Shady Grove).
19. See, e.g., Jack Friedenthal, Defining the Word "Maintain "; Context Counts, 44 AKRON L.
REV. 1139 (2011) (criticizing Scalia's approach and Shady Grove outcome); Joseph P. Bauer,
Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine From a Conflicts
Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (advocating more use of state interest
analysis in resolving Erie questions, although characterizing Shady Grove as case that "does not
break new ground") ("The values which are reflected in the Erie doctrine, and in particular the
importance of federalism, will be enhanced if the Court would take seriously, rather than merely pay
lip-service to, the agreed benefits of identifying and then deferring to, state interests."); Catherine T.
Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Unformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules
Enabling Act, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1676022http://ssm.com/abstract1 676022http://
ssm.com/abstract 1676022http://ssm.com/abstract_1676022http://ssrn.com/abstract_1676022,
manuscript at 9 (finding, like Professor Ides, infra note 69, that neither Sibbach nor Hanna compels
912 [44:907
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benefit to Shady Grove's more formal simplification of Erie. In the
academy, formalism generally enjoys lower status than functionalism
Shady Grove result; suggesting excessive formalism in Scalia approach at odds with public policy
and constitutional concerns underlying Erie doctrine); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 18, 44 (2010),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1677608 (similar criticisms of Scalia plurality and reiterating
long-standing criticism of Professor Burbank that Court should not view Enabling Act as concerned
about federalism when separation of powers was its animating principle) (Shady Grove "path is
wrong because it perpetuates the federalism myth that Sibbach initiated and Hanna reaffirmed. It is
also wrong because, not laid out to reflect that the Act exists primarily to allocate lawmaking power
prospectively, it leads those who take it to seek substantive rights in the wrong places."); Heather
Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REv. 4, 320-30 (2010) (criticizing
Shady Grove and defending Gasperini approach and holding); Kermit Roosevelt, III, Choice ofLaw
in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, (University of Pennsylvania
Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-28, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l1665092 (arguing that traditional substance/procedure
dichotomy of Erie doctrine heavily relied upon in Scalia plurality in Shady Grove is unwise and
Erie questions would be better addressed by standard choice of law methodology, a result that I
view as likely privileging state law more frequently in state-federal conflict); Allan Ides, The
Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove
Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens (Loyola Law School Legal Studies, Working Paper No.
2010-36, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstrct=1667228 (arguing that Stevens approach is
both more accurate in assessing precedential value of Sibbach v. Wilson and better for deciding Erie
questions). Professor Friedenthal is particularly critical in his assessment.
The Shady Grove case required much more serious consideration than it was given by
Justice Scalia and those who signed onto his opinion. The consequences of the decision
are of substantial significance. It effectively permits a final substantive outcome in the
case that is at odds with what would have been decided in a New York court. It thus
results in forum shopping of an extreme nature. One can only wonder if the Rules
Enabling Act should be read to permit such a determination. The case travels far beyond
the scope of other decisions regarding application of a federal rule in a diversity case.
Friedenthal, supra 19, at 1144.
For the reasons set forth in this article, I largely disagree with Professor Friedenthal's
assessment of the alleged unwisdom of the Scalia approach. In addition, the theoretical availability
of a class action in federal court hardly leaves Allstate defenseless. They still may argue against
certification based on the other considerations set forth in FED. R. Civ. P.23 (and are simply
deprived of the categorical procedural defense available under New York's class action rule) and
may defend fully on the merits. In addition, Professor Friedenthal's analysis does not consider the
somewhat tainted bona fides of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) described in Part II, infra, and the prospect
that the formalism of the Shady Grove plurality may spur greater transparency and reflection in state
lawmaking as well as making Erie adjudication simpler.
20. See, e.g., Aaron D. Van Oort & Eileen M. Hunter, Shady Grove v. Allstate: A Case Study
in Formalist Versus Pragmatism, 11 ENGAGE 105, 109 (Sept. 2010) ("In our view, the formalist
majority has the better of the argument in Shady Grove); Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth
of Shady Grove, 37-39 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633541) (noting that after
Shady Grove, previously difficult questions or reconciling differences between FED. R. CIV. P. 56
and state summary judgment rules become relatively easy). See also Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Summary
Judgment in the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1245 (2010); Bernadette Bollas Genetin,
Foreword: Summary Judgment and the Influence ofFederal Rulemaking, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1107,
1130-38 (2010).
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(often also labeled pragmatism or instrumentalism),21 even though law
at its most basic remains a formalist enterprise, with functional
application of judgment coming into play for more complex or nuanced
cases.22 Just as the Ginsburg majority opinion in Gasperini appeared to
enjoy wider acceptance in the academy than the Scalia plurality in Shady
Grove 23 (and Ginsburg generally gets higher marks than Scalia among
academics),24 functionalism is generally preferred to formalism.25
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra
note 7, at 141-45; Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991). This is not to say, however that formalism
does not have its prominent and forceful defenders. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND
LIFE (1991); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Imminent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949 (1988). Although a precise empirical tallying of the legal literature is beyond the scope of this
article (and what's left of my working life), I am confident that were one to poll law faculty at
length, one would find considerably more of them supporting functionalism or characterizing
themselves as functionalist than the other way around.
22. I realize that this assertion, like that accompanying the preceding footnote, may be
difficult to demonstrate to skeptics absent a massive empirical project outside the scope of this
article. But it seems to me inarguable that while formalism governs much of the daily application of
law and holds an important place in jurisprudence, that most legal scholars and arguably the
profession as a whole is functionalist, at least when faced with difficult cases or cases where rigid
application of a formalist approach would lead to results at odds with prevailing concepts of justice,
fairness, and substantive social and economic policy. Perhaps the greatest proof of formalism's
fade in the academy is the degree to which it was dethroned by legal realism and the extent to which
a post-realist, largely functionalist bent characterizes the vast bulk of legal scholarship. See KUKLIN
& STEMPEL, supra note 7, at 149-64 (discussing "vulnerability of high formalism," influential
scholars Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound as precursors to the Legal Realist movement as
well as the movement's displacement of formalism as the dominant school in the legal academy,
despite some taming of realism by the Legal Process movement). See also Anthony J. Sebok, Legal
Positivism and the Growth of Twentieth Century American Jurisprudence (1993) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author).
23. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 19, at 320-30 (criticizing Shady Grove and defending
Gasperini approach and holding).
24. Compare Symposium, The Jurisprudence ofJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Discussion
of Fifteen Years on the U.S. Supreme Court, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095 (2009) (collection of articles
generally praising Ginsburg's work with little criticism); Symposium, The Jurisprudence ofJustice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799 (2009) (same); Symposium, A Celebration of the
Tenth Anniversary of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Appointment on the Supreme Court of the
United States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2004) (same) with Bret C. Birdsong, Justice Scalia's
Footprints on the Public Lands, 83 DEN. U. L. REV. 259 (2005) (viewing Scalia approach to natural
resources and public lands issues as detrimental); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789 (1991)
(emphasizing that Scalia's formalism is still subject to judicial discretion); David A. Strauss,
Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZo L. REV. 1699 (1991) (commenting on the
conflict between Scalia's adherence to tradition, but lack of regard for precedent).
25. See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 7, at 141-64 (characterizing formalism as tending to
be overly simplistic and viewing functionalism or instrumentalism as generally superior legal
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For the most part, I plead guilty to being part of this conventional
wisdom (at least in the academy if not the legal profession at large),
particularly when the formalism is accompanied by an excessively
narrow aproach to interpreting text (of a constitution, statute, contract,
or rule) or lacks humility about the quantum of agreement reasonable
readers might have regarding the meaning of text.27 On this score,
Justice Scalia, a textual absolutist who seems to just "know" when there
are no other reasonable constructions of a word or phrase, again gets
more than his share of academic criticism,28 perhaps deservedly.
Despite such criticism, Justice Scalia has continued to defend his
formalism without contrition.29 After Shady Grove, perhaps his critics
(me included) should be grateful about his combative, unabashed
formalism. In addition to reinvigorating a Sibbach-Hanna approach3 1
that is far simpler to apply as a template for Erie decisions,32 it also may
have the added effect of enhancing democracy in the states and making
the policymaking process modestly less susceptible to interest group
manipulation that flies under the radar of public scrutiny.
Justice Ginsburg's Shady Grove dissent is premised on the notion
that by applying Federal Rule 23 without the limitation on penalty class
actions found in § 901(b), the Court has done violence to an important
method, noting the rise of functionalism and its eventual displacement of formalism as primary
school of intellectual legal thought). See also supra notes 21-24.
26. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1489 (2010) (excessive literalist focus on insurance policy text
can mislead court regarding function and purpose of insurance agreement); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The
Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT, TRIAL, & INS. L.J. PRAc. 813 (2009) (unduly textualist
approach to construing insurance policies can lead to decisions at odds with intended function of
insurance product).
27. See Lawrence Solan et. al., False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM.
L. REv. 1268 (2008) (empirical survey dates reflects readers erroneously believing that nearly all
others share their interpretation of text).
28. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 24; Kramer, supra note 24, at 1797.
29. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1175 (1989).
30. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the
Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 906-07 (2009) (criticizing Justice Scalia's recusal practices and
rationale); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, and
a Misleading Version ofDemocracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583 (1991) (criticizing Justice Scalia and
Court majority for several 1989 Term civil rights and job discrimination decisions (eventually
legislatively overruled in part) unduly limiting reach of statutes through narrow formalist and
textualist construction).
31. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text, discussing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and
Hanna v. Plumer.
32. See Clermont, supra note 20, at I ("In the end, Shady Grove has not fundamentally altered
Erie, but it mercifully makes it more comprehensible").
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and well-considered New York policy, undermining the Erie doctrine's
aspiration for state's rights and state-federal symmetry of litigation
outcomes. The Shady Grove dissent lauds S 3901(b) as 'the result of a
compromise among competing interests," designed in part "as a
means to a manifestly substantive end. Limiting a defendant's liability
in a single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant accumulation of
penalty remedies the New York Legislature created with individual suits
in mind." 34 Similarly, the Stevens concurrence, although less deferential
to the legislation, saw New York's carving out of statutory penalty
claims from class action eligibility as reflecting rational, public-
regarding policymaking. 35
With all due respect to the laudable functionalist orientation of the
Shady Grove dissent and concurrence, a more searching review of the
legislative history and environment surrounding enactment of § 901(b)
presents a far less sanguine picture of the genesis of this class action
carve-out. As discussed below,36 this limitation on an otherwise
generally pro-plaintiff, pro-consumer class action legislation was
designed (perhaps ironically in light of the subsequent Shady Grove
litigation) to bring state practice in accord with the federal approach.
Consequently, § 901(b) looks more suspiciously like interest group
dilution of progressive legislation through back door channels largely
hidden from public scrutiny, with little examination of the substantive
merits of the issue by political elites. Although not smelling completely
of the smoke-filled room, the legislative background of § 901(b) hardly
provides assurance that "the people" of New York viewed this
constriction on vindication of rights as an integral part of state public
policy.
When § 901(b) is seen in this light, the case for the functionalism of
the Stevens concurrence gets considerably stronger while the dissent's
tears over federal overriding of state legislation looks wildly excessive.
Moreover, the case for the formalism of the Scalia plurality opinion
becomes considerably stronger. In addition to removing from the
analysis the burden of scrutinizing state lawmaking which Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens shouldered and making unnecessary any judicial
33. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.1431, 1464 (2010)
(dissent) (quoting Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E. 2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007)).
34. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 1458.
36. See infra text and accompanying note 79, at 139-44 (reviewing legislative history of New
York class action law and criticizing characterization of § 901(b) found in Shady Grove concurrence
and dissent).
916 [44:907
HeinOnline  -- 44 Akron L. Rev. 916 2011
reflection over the importance of a particular law to the state (a burden
shared by the Harlan concurrence in Hanna),3 7 Justice Scalia's approach
also arguably makes it harder for special interests to have their way with
state law in a manner that trumps federal law. Under the methodology
of the Shady Grove plurality, interest groups seeking a particular
substantive result (e.g., immunity from class action treatment to which
other claims and defendants are subject), must get such results enshrined
in substantive law rather than through the stealthier means of engrafting
private-regarding law onto seemingly non-substantive procedural
litigation. In this way, the substantive goals sought by the interest group
are likely to be more widely and openly assessed by a greater segment of
both elite policymakers and the public, with the rationale undergirding
such laws subject to greater critical scrutiny.
A closer look at the legislative background of § 901(b) suggests it
was more like the much decried "earmarks" of modem legislation than
the result of serious and sound substantive policymaking. But under the
Scalia plurality opinion, one need not engage in an assessment of
whether § 901(b) is public-regarding public policy or a special under-
the-radar favor for interest groups. Once § 901(b), has been
denominated a "procedural" provision by New York, it logically must
yield to a clear Federal Rule 23 governing class action litigation. Future
application of the plurality's approach to Erie questions, although sure to
have problems of its own, promises not only greater simplicity and
predictability but also places more pressure on political actors to win
their legislative victories in plain sight after giving more persuasively
reasoned consideration to their proposals.
II. THE SHADY GROVE LITIGATION
Like many eventually high profile Supreme Court cases, Shady
Grove began with an incident that hardly seemed the stuff of
37. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 727, 761-62 (2009) ("[A]lthough earmarks do involve direct congressional involvement in
spending decisions, they are infected with the stench of backroom politics and abandonment of
sensible standards."); Jason Heaser, Note, Pulled Pork: The Three Part Attack on Non-Statutory
Earmarks, 35 J. LEGis. 32, 32 (2009) ("[A] salient feature of earmarks is that they involve funding
directives in areas that would otherwise demand some sort of competitive bidding process."); Brian
Griffith, Note, Lobbying Reform: House-Cleaning or Window Dressing?, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 863,
883 (2006) ("[N]o single act would solve more of the ethical problems in Washington than an
elimination of earmarks in legislation."). But see Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress:
Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (2009) (presenting earmarks
in more complex, partially favorable light).
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constitutional law and complex procedural analysis. Sonia Galvez was
injured in an auto accident on May 20, 2005. A Maryland resident,
Galvez sought care from Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A.
pursuant to a no-fault automobile policy issued by Allstate Insurance
Company, a citizen of Illinois, its state of incorporation and site of its
corporate headquarters. The policy provided, as do standard no-fault
auto policies, for the payment of personal injury protection or "PIP"
benefits, including medical care (up to applicable policy limits). 39
As part of the treatment process, Galvez assigned her right to PIP
benefits to Shady Grove in return for Shady Grove's medical care. In
turn, Shady Grove sought payment from Allstate as Galvez's assignee.40
Despite the Maryland locus of injury and treatment, plaintiffs invoked
New York insurance law as applicable to policyholder Galvez's relations
with her insurer. New York Insurance Law § 5106 (supplemented by
part 653 of title 11 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations, the
state's administrative enforcement of the statute), provides that insurers
must pay undisputed medical bills within thirty days of properly
documented submission, with unpaid claims accruing interest charges at
the rate of two percent per month.4 '
39. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. et. al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467,
469-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
40. See Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
41. See id. at 471. The Shady Grove trial court summarized the law's application to cases
such as the Shady Grove medical treatment of Galvez as follows:
Under New York State's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Insurance Law (the "no-fault
statute"), automobile insurers are required to reimburse policyholders (or insureds), for
certain "basic economic loss" (also known as "no-fault benefits"). See N.Y. Ins. Law §
5102(a)(1). Insureds can assign their right to payment for no-fault benefits to health care
providers who, in turn, may submit claims directly to insurance companies and receive
payment for the claims.
To effectuate the prompt and efficient resolution of claims under the no-fault statute,
the New York State Superintendent of Insurance, in 1977, adopted regulations
establishing time frames in which to submit forms and notices pertaining to such claims.
See generally Medical Soc'y v. Serio, 800 N.E.2d 728, 768 (N.Y. 2003). In their current
form, the regulations require that the insured, or her assigned provider, submit proof of
loss arising from medical treatment within 45 days from the date of treatment. See
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. II § 65-1.1(d). The insurance company, in turn, has thirty days from
receipt of the claim to (i) pay the policyholder (or the medical provider if the claim was
assigned) or (ii) deny the claim. See N.Y. Ins. Law §5106(a); N.Y.C.R.R. tit. II § 65-3.
Payments made by the insurance company after the 30-day period are deemed "overdue"
and subject to a penalty of two percent interest calculated monthly. See N.Y. Ins. Law §
5106(a); N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 11 §§ 65-3.8(a), 65-3.9(a). The 30-day period can be extended
under certain circumstances if the insurer timely request verification of the medical
services for which reimbursement is sought. See N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 11 § 65-3.5. In that
situation, payment must be made within 30 days after the information is supplied to the
insurer. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 5106(a). In sum, the no-fault statute was enacted to
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In a scene unfortunately familiar to medical providers and
policyholders, Allstate failed to make timely payment of the doctor's
bill. Invoking the prompt payments law and seeking recompense
pursuant to the mandatory interest provisions, Shady Grove and Galvez
brought suit in April 2006
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The proposed
class, as defined in the complaint, includes all persons to whom
Allstate owes interest under [§ 5106 and accompanying regulations]
with respect to claims for first-party no-fault benefits arising since
April 20, 2000. Plaintiffs contend that Allstate routinely fails to pay
covered claims for first-party no-fault benefits within the statutorily
mandated time period and routinely ignores its obligation to pay the
statutory interest owed in such cases. Additionally, plaintiffs allege
that Allstate routinely and falsely claims to have never received the
insured's proof of loss in the first instance, so as to avoid violation of
the statutory time restrictions.
... As a class, plaintiffs seek a declaration establishing the parties'
rights, duties, status or other legal relations under affected insurance
contract. Finally, plaintiffs seek compensatory damages in the form of
interest owed to Shady Grove, Galvez and all others similarly
situated.42
Allstate moved to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Although there was complete diversity between Maryland
citizen Shady Grove and Illinois citizen Allstate, the amount at issue in
the Galvez claim, even with the two percent per month interest charges
sought against Allstate amounted to only approximately $500,43 well
short of the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy required to sustain
diversity jurisdiction.44 Only if Shady Grove's unpaid or past due
claims could be joined with those of the putative class could Shady
provide prompt payments of uncontested medical bills.
Shady Grove, 466 F.Supp.2d at 471 (italics of statute and regulations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 470. Galves was eventually dismissed as a party due to lack of standing because she
had completely assigned the right to collect from Allstate to Shady Grove. See id. at 473-74.
43. See id, at 469.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (stating federal diversity jurisdiction requires that matter in
controversy exceed $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs and dispute be between "citizens of
different states"). A corporation is deemed a citizen of both its state of incorporation and "where it
has its principal place of business." See § 1332(c). Absent unusual circumstances, the principal
place of business is the company executive headquarters. See Hertz v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181
(2010).
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Grove meet the requisite jurisdictional amount. But the putative class
was large enough to encompass Illinois citizens, which would destroy
the required complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and
all defendants.45
Because of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"),46 passed by
Congress as an attempt to respond to the perceived problem of collusive
or abusive state court class actions,47 a class action such as that sought
by Shady Grove was permitted even in the absence of complete
diversity. This allowed the exercise of federal court jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), so long as the case otherwise qualified
as a class action. Although claims such as the Galvez bill were small,
when combined with those of other medical providers, the jurisdictional
amount was easily met. Shady Grove contended that the damages to the
class from Allstate's alleged slow pay subterfuge exceeded $5 million.48
But in moving to dismiss, Allstate had two very strong cards to
play-(1) New York's class action law (§ 901(b)), which prohibits class
actions that seek enforcement of a statutory penalty absent express
authorization in the statute, which was lacking in Insurance Law § 5106,
and (2) the Erie doctrine, which requires that federal courts sitting in
diversity apply controlling state substantive law in the case, although
they are obligated to apply federal procedural law.49  If, as alleged by
45. See Strawbridge et al. v. Curtiss et al., 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (establishing requirement of
complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
102.12[1] (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2010) (describing background and operation of complete diversity
requirement).
46. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) and in other
sections of Title 28.
47. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 45, § 3705 (describing background and
contents of CAFA); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008). Describing the Act, Professor
Burbank notes the problematic nature of the law and its potential for unintended consequences:
[CAFA] resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the aisle by interest
groups associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), partisan wrangling, and,
following two successful filibusters, fragile compromises. [CAFA marks] a sharp break
from a nearly uniform history of congressional contraction of diversity jurisdiction. The
scope of putative class actions that, at the end of the day, the statute brings within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is very broad. Those facts-coupled with
the legislation's place in a trio of "tort reform" measures sought by the Bush
administration, and with unrelenting attacks on lawyers in general and plaintiffs' lawyers
in particular-help to understand why some critics regard the compromises as
insufficient and the ultimate legislation as inimical to the interests of numerous groups of
potential litigants.
See id. at 1441 (footnotes omitted).
48. See Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp.2d at 469.
49. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the Erie doctrine).
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Allstate, § 901(b) was New York substantive law (despite being encased
in a state procedural provision), the Shady Grove class action was barred
in federal court just as it would be in New York's state courts.
Alternatively, if § 901(b) was a state rule of civil procedure, it was
overridden or displaced by Federal 23, which contained no restriction on
statutory penalty class actions of this type.
If an alien from another planet were to land on Earth and be
appraised of the Erie doctrine in sound bite fashion (in federal court
diversity cases, federal procedure and state substantive law apply), a
case like Shady Grove might seem deceptively easy. The case was
obviously in federal court, which has a comprehensive body of civil
rules, including Federal Rule 23, which extensively regulates class
actions. The shortest way with the Erie question is simple application
of Federal Rule 23 regardless of the underlying substantive content of
any conflicting New York rules of civil procedure. But with the possible
exception of Erie itself,' the Erie doctrine has never been simple.
Distinguishing between procedure and substance can be difficult,
particularly where a court is attempting to achieve the symmetry of state
and federal outcomes sought in Erie and to avoid the type of unseemly
federal-state forum shopping that motivated Justice Brandeis's Erie
opinion.52 In addition, there can be difficult questions as to the scope of
50. I use the phrase in homage to Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV.
388 (1942), which urged a streamlined approach to statutory construction, albeit one I find
incomplete and flawed, realizing that reasonable observers might think the same of the Shady Grove
plurality opinion and my enthusiasm for it.
51. In Erie, a Pennsylvania plaintiff sued a New York-based railroad for injuries he suffered
while walking along the footpath adjacent to one of its tracks in Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania
tort law, plaintiff Tompkins was considered a mere trespasser and owed no duty but the railroad's
refraining from inflicting intentional injury. But under the federal common law of tort, which
applied in federal diversity cases prior to Erie, plaintiff was a licensee permitted to use the footpath
by custom and practice and was owed a duty of reasonable car by the defendant. Erie itself thus
presented a clear choice of different substantive rules of tort law. No one contended that the
trespasser/licensee distinction was procedural. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
52. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75 (describing the policy goal of change in Erie from prior rule of
Swift v. Tyson was to harmonize applicable law and outcomes in similar cases in federal and state
court and to discourage excessive forum shopping). Justice Brandeis was particularly upset with
pre-Erie cases such as Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928) in which a Kentucky cab company wished to enter into an exclusive
arrangement with the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, also a Kentucky Corporation, giving it a
monopoly on taxi service at the Bowling Green, Kentucky train station. The cab company avoided
the state's prohibition on such an arrangement by re-incorporating in Tennessee and successfully
sued in federal court for a declaratory judgment that the monopoly arrangement was permissible. It
succeeded due to the application of federal common law, which differed from Kentucky state law,
to the contract. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-75.
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a procedural rule and the boundaries of its application. Where the reach
of a federal procedural rule ends, courts have metaphorically entered the
territory of state substantive law.
Beginning largely with Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,53
the Supreme Court focused on whether application of a federal civil rule
or a state law would make a difference in the case outcome, holding in
York itself that a state statute of limitations applied to bar a claim that
was otherwise timely under federal procedural rules.54  Similarly, in
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., the Court applied a
Kansas requirement that a defendant be served with process within two
years to bar a tort claim even though the action had been commenced in
federal court prior to the expiration of the statute pursuant to Federal
Rule 3.56 When a similar situation arose fifteen years later, the Court's
Hanna v. Plumer opinion surprised some observers and changed the
contours of the Erie doctrine by applying Federal Rule 4, which
permitted substituted service of process, rather than chapter 197, section
9 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, which required that executors
of estates be provided with in-hand personal service within a year in
order to be timely, thus permitting in federal court a tort claim against a
decedent's estate that would have been barred in Massachusetts state
court. 57
Hanna's refinement of the Erie doctrine was to specifically
establish two tracks of Erie analysis. In one track were cases where
there was an applicable Federal Civil Rule. In such cases, the federal
rule would govern unless the Rule exceeded the powers of rulemaking
conferred in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which
53. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
54. Id. at 111.
55. Categorized Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.530 (1949).
56. Id. at 533-34.
57. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,466-70 (1965).
58. Properly promulgated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the force of statute and "laws
in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
59. The Act gives the U.S. Supreme Court "power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of
appeals." Rules are promulgated through a process in which an Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules, appointed by the Chief Justice, makes recommendations, which are in turn reviewed and
approved by a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and by the Judicial
Conference of the United States and ultimately then promulgated by the Court, which submits the
proposed Rule or Rules to Congress on or before May I of a given year. If Congress does not alter,
amend, or block a proposed Rule within 180 days, the Rule takes effect December 1. See generally
28 U.S.C. §§2073, 2074; Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1139 (2010)
(describing process of Rules amendments in the context of changes to FED. R. CrV. P. 56 that took
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mandates that federal R rocedural rules "not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right." 0 In the absence of an on-point, valid, civil rule,
the Court was left with the "relatively unguided" task of determining
whether the state law at issue was sufficiently substantive in that its
application was required by constitutionally based principles of
federalism and Erie's policy goals of avoiding, where possible, disparate
outcomes in state and federal court as well as the discouragement of
undue federal-state forum shopping.61
Although Hanna strengthened the role of the Federal Rules,
reinvigorating pro-Rules case law that had been somewhat forgotten,
Hanna was not enough of a game changer to undo the 1949 Ragan
ruling. In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 2 the Court re-affirmed its
commitment to Ragan and a narrow reading of Federal Rule 3 (as
governing primarily issues of intra-federal court timing rather than
required notice for purposes of statutes of limitation)63 and applied an
Oklahoma law requiring service of process upon a defendant (rather than
filing in court) within the prescribed state limitations period if a tort
claim was to be timely and subject to litigation in federal court.64
Thus, the Erie doctrine retained substantial clout that could prevent
application of what to the uninitiated might seem like a simply matter of
applying federal procedural rules. Particularly strengthening Allstate's
case was Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc.,65 which required
an application of New York CPLR § 5501 regarding judicial review of
verdicts as to alleged excessiveness notwithstanding the presence of
Federal Rule 59, which governs motions for new trials. Because Rule 59
does not expressly list the grounds and criteria for the grant of a new
trial, the Gasperini Court found it not to be in conflict with the New
York law in a 5-4 opinion displaying some sharp contrasts between
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent.66
effect Dec. 1, 2010); Steven Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982) (providing a comprehensive review of the Act).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
61. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. See also id. at 466-67 (stating that York's outcome
determinative test was "never intended to serve as a talisman.").
62. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
63. See id. at 749-51 & 742.
64. See id. at 751-53.
65. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
66. Compare id. at 418 (Ginsburg majority opinion) (joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter and Breyer) with id at 448 (Scalia dissent) (joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas). See also id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting on different grounds). The
distinctions in the Scalia and Stevens analyses presage and are similar to their jurisprudential
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Against this backdrop, the Shady Grove trial court found Allstate's
argument against class certification persuasive,67 as did the Second
Circuit.68  But a slim majority of the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that Federal Rule 23 controlled the issue of class certification in
federal court, overriding a contrary state court rule. "Because the New
York law attempts to answer the same question, but in a different way,
i.e., stating that the suit may not be maintained as a class action because
of the relief it seeks, the New York law must give way to the Federal
Rule unless the Federal Rule is invalid."69
The Scalia plurality opinion followed Chief Justice Earl Warren's
methodology in Hanna and relied heavily on the seventy-year old
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc. decision7 0 that predated Guaranty Trust of
conflict in Shady Grove. See infra note 89-94 and accompanying text (describing their respective
Shady Grove opinions).
67. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. et. al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467,
472-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
68. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir.
2008) (unanimous decision of panel comprised of Judges Rosemary Pooler, opinion author, Jose
Cabranes, and Robert Katzmann).
69. Allan Ides, Rule 23 Prevails Over New York Law Limiting Class Actions: U.S. Supreme
Court Construes The Rules Enabling Act, LEXSEE 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5075 (May 25, 2010)
("The Court rejected the Second Circuit's argument that Rule 23 and the New York law address
different issues and, therefore, do not conflict."). Further summarizing the decision, Professor Ides
noted that the Second Circuit had found no conflict by viewing FED. R. Civ. P. 23 as conceming
only the criteria for deciding when a class may be certified while § 901(b) focused on the issue of
whether the type of claim asserted was eligible for class action treatment.
The Court rejected this distinction between eligibility and certifiability as "entirely
artificial," noting that both are preconditions for maintaining a class action. The Court
read Rule 23 as empowering a federal court to certify a class in each and every case in
which the Rule's criteria are met, so that any purported limitation on that power, such as
the New York law's prohibition on class actions seeking statutory penalties, necessarily
conflicts with it.
Id.
70. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
The fundamental difficulty with both [concurrence and dissent] arguments is that the
substantive nature of New York's law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference.
A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others - or
valid in some cases and invalid in others - depending upon whether its effect is to
frustrate a state substantive law (or a state procedural law enacted for substantive
purposes). That could not be clearer[than] in Sibbach: [quoting Sibbach at length].
... We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal
Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure. [citing Sibbach, Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-70 (1965), and Burlington N. R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8
(1987)]. If it does, it is authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect
[44:907924 AKRON LAW REVIEW
HeinOnline  -- 44 Akron L. Rev. 924 2011
New York v. York and its outcome determinative test. 71 For the plurality,
the finding of an applicable federal rule was nearly the end of the Erie
inquiry: if the federal rule is on point, it controls unless it violates the
Enabling Act. But if the federal rule is genuinely procedural, the
safeguards of the Enabling Act process almost guaranty that the resulting
rule does not violate the Act.
The framework for our decision is familiar. We must first
determine whether Rule 23 answers the question in dispute. If it does,
it governs-New York's law notwithstanding-unless it exceeds
statutory authorization or Congress's rulemaking power. We do not
wade into Erie's murky waters unless the federal rule is inapplicable or
invalid.
... [Federal Rule 23 by its terms] creates a categorical rule entitling a
plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a
class action. . . . Thus, Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all formula for
deciding the class-action question. Because § 901(b) attempts to
answer the same question-i.e., it states that Shady Grove's suit "may
not be maintained as a class action" because of the relief it seeks-it
cannot apply in diversity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vires.72
For the plurality, "the only criterion for validity under the [Rules
Enabling Act] is whether the rule really regulates procedure, i.e., the
judicial process of enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them." 73  For Justice Scalia and the plurality, it was not
to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
71. See Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) ("The question is whether such a statute
concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State,
is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is
relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal
court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the
same parties in a State court?"); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 45, § 62 (discussing
York's attempt to create consistent results regardless of whether a case arises in state court or federal
court, but pointing out that the outcome determinative approach is ineffective because "it is difficult
to conceive of any rule of procedure that cannot have a significant effect on the outcome of the
case.").
72. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the Court)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
73. Ides, supra note 69 ("If [the federal civil rule] governs only the manner and the means by
which a litigant's rights are enforced, it is valid; if it alters the rules of decision by which the court
will adjudicate those rights, it is not. Whether the rule will incidentally affect a litigant's
substantive rights, which most procedural rules do, is beside the point.").
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important whether § 901(b) reflected substantive state law or policy. Its
status as a state rule of procedure required that it take a back seat to an
applicable federal rule.
The plurality found no question that § 901(b) was procedural rather
than substantive. "Unlike a law that sets a ceiling on damages (or puts
other remedies out of reach) in properly filed class actions, § 901(b) says
nothing about what remedies a court may award; it revents the class
actions it covers from coming into existence at all." Regardless of
whether § 901(b) was pursuing state substantive policy rather than
merely providing procedural ground rules, § 901(b) and Federal Rule 23
"flatly contradict each other."75  Regarding Enabling Act precedent
about the validity of civil rules, Justice Scalia noted that the Court has
"rejected every statutory challenge to a federal Rule that has come
before us." Although [e]ach of these rules had some practical effect on
the parties' rights," he emphasized that "each undeniably regulated only
the process for enforcing those rights; none altered the rights themselves,
the available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the court
adjudicated either." 76
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, in an analysis similar to that of her
Gasperini majority opinion, argued that § 901(b) was indeed an
expression of New York substantive law, enacted to effect an important
state policy.77 Under the dissent's concept of Erie, the Court must be
sensitive to such important state interests. In reaching the view that §
901(b)'s limitation on statutory penalty class actions was such an
important state interest, the dissent relied heavily on its view of the
statute's legislative history.79 As discussed in Part III, below, this view
of the prohibition's genesis was incomplete and arguably misleading in
that § 901(b) looks at least as much as an ill-examined bit of interest
group horse-trading as it does a considered expression of public policy
74. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439 (footnote omitted).
75. See id. at 1441.
76. See id. at 1442-43 (citations omitted). As the Court has consistently done, Justice Scalia
categorized Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) and Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) as cases in which the scope of the federal rule (FED. R.
CIv. P. 3) was too narrow to conflict with the state rules in question (governing commencement of
actions by service of process prior to the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations).
77. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 1460-65.
79. See id at 1463-64. See also infra notes 80-81 & 150-52 and accompanying text
(addressing completeness and accuracy of the dissent's characterization of § 901(b)'s legislative
history).
926 [44:907
HeinOnline  -- 44 Akron L. Rev. 926 2011
norms. A similar but less cheerleading view of § 901(b)'s derivation is
reflected in the concurrence as well.8 '
The Scalia plurality and the Ginsburg dissent each commanded four
votes. The Stevens concurrence broke the tie in favor of application of
Federal Rule 23 over § 901(b). At the end of this hotly litigated Erie
question, five jurists sided with Federal Rule 23 (Justices Stevens,
Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor and Stevens) while eight (Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy and Alito as well as trial judge Nina
Gershon and Second Circuit judges Rosemary Pooler, Jose Cabranes,
and Robert Katzmann)82 preferred application of § 901(b). Justice
Stevens sided with the federal rule through a considerably more
functionalist route, more jurisprudentially aligned with the Ginsburg
dissent than the Scalia plurality in method if not result.83
Justice Stevens, like the dissenters, was more concerned about
being sensitive to state substantive law and policy and openly
acknowledged the degree to which that law and policy may be encased
in state procedural provisions. Similarly, Justice Stevens acknowledged
that the application of particular procedural rules often has substantive
consequences and noted that the Court's Erie precedents had often
applied ostensibly procedural state laws and rules that had clear
substantive impact in terms of affecting a litigant's success in federal
court litigation. But to a greater degree than Justice Scalia in the
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens sought to balance the state and federal
84interests presented in the case.
In Shady Grove, he found the balance to tip in favor of Federal
Rule 23 in that New York had chosen to express its reservations about
statutory penalty class actions in a state procedural rule. Federal Rule 23
governs class actions in federal court. Under the Stevens examination of
whether conflicting state procedural practice contains important state
substantive law, it does not violate the Enabling Act.8 5  As such, §
901(b) was New York's statement about how its courts should deal with
such matters, but was not enough of an expression by the state as to the
absolute scope of state statutory remedies such as Insurance Law § 5106.
Further, § 901(b) did not itself define state rights and remedies regarding
80. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
81. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1458-59.
82. See infra note 41 & 68 and accompanying text (discussing trial and appellate court history
of Shady Grove).
83. See Shady Grove, 130 U.S. at 1448 (Steven, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 1448-54.
85. See id. at 1457-59.
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the substantive issues presented in the Shady Grove litigation.86
Although § 901(b) has aspects of a cap on damages, which Justice
Stevens would have regarded as applicable controlling substantive law
under Erie, New York did not adopt a cap but instead addressed its
policy concerns only through a procedural rule. Under these
circumstances, Justices Stevens as the key fifth vote was unwilling to
require the ousting of federal procedural law by this type of state
provision.
Notwithstanding support from Justice Stevens on the merits and
holding of the case, Justice Scalia could not resist severe criticism of the
concurrence as an imprudent legal approach. Part II.C. of Justice
Scalia's opinion (which Justice Sotomayor did not join, perhaps because
it she viewed it as surplusage, perhaps because it seemed an almost ad
hominem attack on the reasoning of a colleague providing a crucial vote,
or perhaps because her own Erie approach is not as formalistically
supportive of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when in conflict with
state law), spends several pages attacking the Stevens approach to
assessing the validity of a federal rule under the Enabling Act.
To perhaps oversimplify, Justice Scalia's focus is whether an
applicable federal rule "really regulates procedure" rather than setting
forth substantive law encased in a procedural code. If the rule in
question is truly one of procedure (i.e., the methodology by which
substantive claims are litigated), it is valid under the Enabling Act and
applies notwithstanding contrary state law.
We have long held that [the Enabling Act's limitation that federal
procedural rules not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights]
means that the Rule must "really regulat[e] procedure-the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them. The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant's
substantive rights; most procedural rules do. What matters is what the
rule itself regulates: If it governs only "the manner and the means" by
which the litigants' rights are "enforced," it is valid; if it alters "the
rules of decision by which the court will adjudicate [those] rights," it is
89
not.
86. See id
87. See id. at 1458-59.
88. See id at 1444-48.
89. See id. at 1442 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
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In contrast, Justice Stevens focuses more on the Enabling Act
requirement that the federal procedural rule at issue not "abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right." If it does, it cannot overcome
the state law or rule, no matter how procedural the federal rule's
function. In Shady Grove, Justice Stevens found Federal Rule 23 not to
have changed state substantive law.90 Notwithstanding plaintiff Shady
Grove's success in being allowed to seek class action status in federal
court, insurance companies like Allstate and other defendants facing
statutory penalties continue to enjoy their immunity from state court
class actions.
For Justice Scalia, the Stevens approach was unwise both because it
deviated from the precedential simplicity of Sibbach and because it
required a court to make a more sustained, time consuming, and
potentially value-laden assessment of the relative importance of the
conflicting state law rather than simply drawing a bright line between
the procedural and the substantive. For Justice Stevens, the Scalia
approach was an over-reading of Sibbach v. Wilson and was unfaithful to
the command of the Enabling Act that the Court ensure that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure not oust or negate state substantive law, which
could occur even if the state statute or rule did not alter an otherwise
applicable substantive rule or decision. 92
Despite occasionally snippy rhetoric in the Scalia and Stevens
opinions, 3 the practical consequences of their approaches are quite
90. See id. at 1456-60.
91. See id at 1444-45 ("The concurrence would decide this case on the basis, not that Rule 23
is procedural, but that the state law it displaces is procedural, in the sense that it does not "function
as part of the State's definition of substantive rights and remedies." A state procedural rule is not
preempted, according to the concurrence, so long as it is "so bound up with," or "sufficiently
intertwined with," a substantive state-law right or remedy "that it defines the scope of that
substantive right or remedy,"... . This analysis squarely conflicts with Sibbach, which established
the rule we apply." (citations omitted)).
92. See id. at 1454-1455 (contending that plurality over-reads or over-extends Sibbach
without sufficient sensitivity for Enabling Act requirement that judicially promulgated procedural
rules not supplant state substantive law.
93. See, e.g., id. at 1445 (Scalia, J.) ("In reality, the concurrence seeks not to apply Sibbach,
but to overrule it (or, what is the same, to rewrite it.")); id. at 1446, n.1 1 ("The concurrence's
approach, however, is itself unfaithful to the statute's terms" and "would allow States to force a
wide array of parochial procedures on federal courts so long as they are 'sufficiently intertwined
with a state right or remedy"), id at 1446 ("Why we should cast aside our decades-old decision
escapes us, especially since (as the concurrence explains) that would not affect the result"), id. at
1447 ("[T]he concurrence's approach does nothing to diminish the difficulty [of drawing the line
between procedure and substance], but rather magnifies it many times over. Instead of a single hard
question of whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure, that approach will present
hundreds of hard questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural character
of countless state rules that may conflict with a single Federal Rule); id. at 1447, n.15 ("[The
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similar and compatible. One advantage of the Scalia approach is its
simplicity and relative ease of application. Another is that it is less
likely to result in the invalidation of federal rules, which result only after
a considerable expenditure of effort by the legal community. In the
alternative, an advantage of the Stevens approach is that it provides for
more problematic cases a means for striking down federal rules that
seriously conflict with state substantive law and policy.94
Shady Grove presents interesting and difficult questions about the
scope of the Federal Civil Rules, deference to state law and policy,
equivalence of federal and state litigation outcomes, forum shopping,
and the jurisprudence of federalism as well as revisiting long-running
concerns over the costs and benefits of class actions. It also provides an
interesting window on the jurisprudential preferences of the Justices.
The case has spurred and will continue to spur substantial academic
commentary and further litigation96 regarding the contours of the Erie
doctrine.
concurrence's proposed] amorphous inquiry into the 'nature and functions' of a state law will tend
to increase, rather than decrease the difficulty of classifying Federal Rules as substantive or
procedural. Walking through the concurrence's application of its test to § 901(b) gives little reason
to hope that its approach will lighten the burden for lower courts."
See also id. at 1448, 1452-53 (Steven, J., concurring) (Justice Scalia believes that the sole
Enabling Act question is whether the federal rule "really regulates procedure [as narrowly and
perhaps glibly defined in the plurality opinion]. I respectfully disagree [observing in accompanying
footnote 7 that "[tlhis understanding of the Enabling Act has been the subject of substantial
academic criticism, and rightfully so") (citing sources)]. This interpretation of the Enabling Act is
consonant with the Act's first limitation to 'general rules of practice and procedure,' But it ignores
the second limitation that such rules also 'not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," and
in so doing ignores the balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and
respect for a State's construction of its own rights and remedies. It also ignores the separation-of-
powers presumption and federalism presumption that counsel against judicially created rules
displacing state substantive law." (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)), id. at 1453, n.8 (Justice
Scalia's objection [to the concurrence contention that a state procedural code may really express
state substantive law and policy] misses the key point."); id. at 1453, n.9 (Justice Scalia's response
to concurrence argument "highlights how empty the plurality's test really is" and invites undue
"speculation" regarding congressional intent).
94. See Ides, supra note 19.
95. See, e.g., supra notes 17, 19, 20.
96. See, e.g., Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575 (2010) (putative Telephone Consumer
Protection Act class action with certification initially denied by lower courts on grounds similar to
trial court and Second Circuit rational in Shady Grove, remanded for further consideration in light
of Supreme Court's Shady Grove decision); Retained Realty, Inc. v. McCabe, 376 Fed. Appx. 52
(2d Cir. 2010) (applying Shady Grove to Erie question in litigation); Pefanis v. Westway Diner,
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 002 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93180 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 7, 2010) (same);
Giovanniello v. ALM Media, No. 3:09cvl409 (JBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92181 (D. Conn. Sept.
3, 2010) (same); Leyse v. Bank of Am., No. 09 Civ. 7654 (JGK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58461
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2010) (same); Leyse v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., et al., No. 1:09-CV-
237, 2010 U.S. Dist., Lexis 54103 (S.D.N.Y. June 2,2010) (same).
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An under-discussed aspect of both the decision and the doctrine,
however, is the precise derivation and nature of § 901(b)'s limitation on
certain types of class actions, its wisdom and impact, and the degree to
which the Court's different Erie approaches may encourage or frustrate
reflective and transparent state lawmaking. Although formalism has
taken its share of blows in the academy and the courts, in the Erie
context it may encourage sounder, more deliberative state lawmaking by
limiting the degree to which relatively unexamined state law favorable to
interest groups may be hidden in state procedural codes rather than
openly discussed, debated, and decided as a matter of substantive law.
Shady Grove itself provides an illustration in that the § 901(b)
prohibition on statutory penalty class actions proves on closer
examination than given by the Shady Grove courts (at all levels) to be
more problematic and less worthy of judicial deference than first meets
the eye.
See also Holster, 130 S. Ct. at 1576 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Holster decision below was supported by adequate and independent state law ground
not conflicting with FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and that vacating judgment below is error) ("I would spare
the Court of Appeals the necessity of revisiting-and, presumably, reinstating-its TCPA-grounded
ruling"); Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2010) (on remand, Second Circuit, as
predicted by Justice Ginsburg, reaffirmed previous ruling on basis other than § 901(b) ban on
statutory penalty class actions).
Regarding Shady Grove itself, the case continues after remand. See 380 Fed. Appx. 96
(2d Cir. 2010) (remanding case to trial court for further proceedings); No. 06-CV-1842 (NG) (JO),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64492 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010) (rejecting Allstate's contention that claim
is moot because insurer has paid the medical bill and statutory interest initially sought by Shady
Grove, noting that this had occurred prior to U.S. Supreme Court's decision and that Allstate did not
at that time think the matter moot). See id at *3 ("[Allstate's motion] plainly raises the question of
why, if that payment mooted the case as Allstate now claims, it did not say so earlier but instead
pursued complex litigation before the appellate court and then the Supreme Court."). At the risk of
sounding cynical, one wonders why the Shady Grove dissenters were so interested in expending
legal resources in a functional question to help this rather unattractive litigant accused of
systematically chiseling auto accident victims and their medical providers. Even if the facts alleged
by plaintiff are incorrect, the Shady Grove case itself illustrates the arguable futility of individual
imposition of statutory penalties to curb bad but profitable behavior by insurers and other
economically powerful interests. Simultaneously, Shady Grove calls into serious question the
wisdom of § 901(b)'s ban on statutory penalty class actions.
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III. NEW YORK CLASS ACTION LAW AND ITS RESTRICTIONS ON
ACTIONS SEEKING STATUTORY PENALTIES
A. The Impetus for Class Action Reform in New York
The Shady Grove story has roots arguably as old as 184997 and
began in earnest in 1966, the year that far-reaching amendments to
Federal Rule 23 effect.98 The 1966 amendments expanded the utility
and potential for use of the class action device in federal courts,
prompting many states to follow suit in the aftermath of the federal rules
change.9 9  In what is now seen as perhaps excessive optimism over the
potential of the class action to right wrongs, support for class actions by
consumers and investors rocketed, leading to a wave of federal court
litigation that, although later leading to second thoughts, did not
generally inhibit enthusiasm for the class action device. In the aftermath
of the 1966 Amendment to Federal Rule 23, a generally pro-claimant
law reform mentality held sway, one that included expanded discovery
and access to information, a continued liberal attitude toward pleading,
and expanding substantive rights for consumers, individuals and
minorities.100  There eventually emerged fierce opposition to this
movement as well as backlash against its perceived excesses, forces that
during the ensuing 40 years would change the litigation picture
dramatically. 10'
97. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1005 (predecessor to current state class action law at N.Y, C.P.L.R. §
901 et seq.).
98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 & advisory committee Note (1966), reprinted in FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 2010-2011 EDUCATION EDITION 126-31 (2010).
99. See JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.20 (describing history of class action litigation);
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
(1987) (detailing development of class action, including importance of 1966 Amendment to FED. R.
Civ. P. 23); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement
Through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L. QTRLY
1127, 1133-55 (2005) [hereinafter Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision] (reviewing
development of modem federal class action).
100. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. REV. 664 (1979) (describing optimism in wake of 1966
amendments displaced to some extent by excessive fear of large class actions, criticizing Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), which required expensive actual mailed notice to class
members in Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action).
101. See Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision, supra note 99 at 1128-32 (noting
mounting criticisms of class actions from 1970s to almost fever pitch during 1990s and early
twenty-first century); Charles Silver, "We 're Scared to Death ": Class Certification and Blackmail,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (noting opposition to class actions as extortive but assessing such
contentions as exaggerated); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000) (noting
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As the 1970s began, the class action was riding high and enjoyed
the esteem of courts, scholars, and public interest groups despite strong
opposition from much of the business community. New York was
something of a laggard in this trend. Its class action law dated back to
1849 and precluded class action treatment where a defendant's allegedly
wrongful conduct was not simultaneously directed at a discrete and
relatively confined group.103 Class actions were impossible under New
York law, at least as historically applied by the courts, even where the
conduct was uniform (e.g., a standardized insurance policy, form
similar assessment finding great criticism of class actions but deeming much of the criticism
overblown or unfounded); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New
Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (1995) (contending that despite the benefits of
class actions in theory they are in practice often abusive).
Regarding the backlash against the rights revolution and access to the courts generally, see
Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81TEX. L.
REV. 285 (2002); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Bane or
Boon?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965 (1998); Steven N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch
It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal
Science or Crumbling Construct? Tends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 659 (1993); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith, Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
102. See, e.g., Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 609 (1971) (urging that New York adopt class action law similar to FED. R. CIv. P. 23);
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967) (expressing optimism about new FED. R.
Civ. P. 23); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision ofProcedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L.
REV. 433 (1960) (advocating expansion of class actions availability).
103. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1005; Onofrio v. Playboy Club of N.Y., 205 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1965) (holding class certification denied where patrons were each allegedly erroneously
charged $25 fee); Hall v. Coburn Corp., 259 N.E.2d 720, 720-22 (N.Y. 1970) (holding certification
denied for putative class alleging illegally small type in credit contracts despite standardized form
nature of contracts; interest of class members insufficiently common where they engaged in
different transactions involving same form); Soc'y Milion Athena, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of Greece, 22
N.E.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. 1939) (showing court's refusal to certify a class of depositors seeking return
of funds allegedly illegally received by bank on grounds depositors are insufficiently "united in
interest: in that "[n]one of them has any lien or interest, legal or equitable against the property
transferred or against any other assets of defendants" and thus "have no joint or common interest in
any fund."). But see Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 316 N.E.2d 320, 321-23 (N.Y. 1974)
(class certification permitted where putative class consisted of owners who were all holders of
debentures benefited by the same trust and allegedly injured in the same manner by trustee
wrongdoing). See also Alfonso A. Narvaez, Local Veto Voted on OTB Parlors, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
11, 1975, at 46 [hereinafter Narvaez, Local Veto Voted on OTB Parlors] (subsidiary reporting on
"Class-Action Bill") ("While current laws in New York State permit class actions in certain cases,
restrictive interpretations of the statutes by the courts made consumer suits virtually impossible to
initiate.").
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contract, or a nationwide policy) if the proposed plaintiff class was
affected by the defendant's conduct at different times and place.104
This limitation placed New York class action law in the relative
Dark Ages as compared to Federal Rule 23, which in turn created
considerable pressure for modernization. Consumer groups and
progressives with substantial support in the judiciary argued for a new
class action law. Law professor Adolf Homburger, then Chair of the
CPLR Committee of the New York State Judicial Conference, published
an important article urging that New York amend its class action law to
conform to the federal rule. os The Administrative Board of the Judicial
Conference, chaired by influential and prestigious Court of Appeals
Judge Stanley Fuld, endorsed class action reform.106
The Court of Appeals went on record in favor of reform, almost
engoing in legal blackmail in Moore v. Metropolitan Life InsuranceCo. Plaintiff challenged the insurer's refusal to pay for treatment by a
psychologist under its group major medical insurance policy covering
state employees, contending that the policy's limitation to reimbursing
104. See Letter from New York City Mayor Abraham D. Beame (by Legislative Representative
Reinard E. Yousiven) to Gov. Hugh L. Carey (June 2, 1975) (praising eventual enactment of class
action legislation and criticizing old New York law by noting: "If a thousand consumers are
defrauded and all sign the very same piece of paper, one may sue for the benefit of all, but if they
sign one thousand identical standard form contracts, they lack the requisite unity of interest. This
renders the class action statute illusory for many consumers. The proposed class action bill
eliminated the unity of interest requirement and thus provides the consumer with a practical
remedy."). See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 307 N.E.2d 554 (N.Y. 1973).
105. See Homburger, supra note 102; Weinstein, supra note 102 (advocating expansion of
class actions availability. In addition, Columbia Law Professors Jack Greenberg and Philip Schrag
and others had been pushing for class action reform in litigation as well as in articles. See, e.g.,
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (attempting large class
action for Truth in Lending violations but certification denied on grounds it would create
excessively coercive pressure on defendants); see also Schrag & Meltsner, Class Action: A Way to
Beat the Bureaucracies Without Increasing Them, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1972, at 55;
Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (1966) (cited in Memorandum of June 10, 1975 from Keneth P. Norwick,
Legislative Dir., N.Y. Civil Liberties Union to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel in support of
class action legislation after passage while awaiting gubernatorial signature) (at pp. 1-2). Similar
articles favoring expanded class action availability were cited in Memorandum of May 29, 1975
from the State Consumer Protection Board to Counsel to the Governor at p. 5, n.18 (citing Resnikoff
& Shrag, Pending State Class-Action Legislation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 14, 1974, p. I and Shrag &
Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer: The Bankruptcy Law Has Nothing to Offer, 72 COLUM, L.
REv. 1147, 1148, 1169-72 (1972).
106. See Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007) (noting judicial
conference support of class action law). Court of Appeals Judge Stanley Fuld was a highly regarded
jurist, with a pro-business reputation. See Sidney H. Stein, Stanley H. Fuld: A Life Lived in the
Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 258 (2004).
107. 307 N.E.2d 554 (N.Y. 1973).
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services only if provided by medical doctors had been nullified by
statute. The court found the imposition of coverage valid, but denied
class action treatment pursuant to CPLR § 1005 and applicable
precedent despite misgivings about continuing along this course of stare
decisis.
The court is also aware that there was pending before the Legislature
last year and will be again this year a comprehensive proposal to
provide a broadened scope and a more liberal procedure for class
actions, an objective shared by members of this court. (See Senate
Bill, No, 8544 [1972]; Assembly Bill, No. 10448 [1972].) Because the
proposed statute would assure limitations and safeguards which would
be highly desirable in broadening the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State over class actions, legislation in this area is highly preferable to
the alternative of judicial development in the same direction. In our
view there is urgency for early legislation to accomplish these
purposes, in light of the general and judicial dissatisfaction with the
existing restriction on class actions which in many instances may mean
a total lack of remedy, as a practical matter, for wrongs demanding
.108
correction.
The lone dissenter in Moore, Judge Sol Wachtler, a Lonf Island
Republican, then a star on the judicial and political horizon,' 0  argued
that the court should forgo waiting for an unpredictable legislature and
enter the modem era of class action legislation via common law
decision-making:
[T]his class should be certified. As noted by the majority, "the
restrictive interpretation in the past of CPLR § 1005 and its
predecessor statute no longer has the viability it may once have had."
Remembering that those restrictive interpretations were a product of
this court, it would seem most appropriate that this court, recognizing
the need for a broadened and more liberal rocedure for class actions,
should take the initiative in that direction.
The early efforts to which the Moore Court alluded had foundered
due to the resistance of Republicans, who then controlled the State
108. See id at 558.
109. In an astoundingly ironic and sad story, Judge Wachtler eventually was convicted and
incarcerated as a result of harassing a former paramour in a notorious case of obsessive love gone
bad. He survived a stabbing in prison and was eventually released but, as might be expected, did
not return to public life or legal prominence. See SOL WACHTLER, AFTER THE MADNESS ( 1997);
LINDA WOLFE, DOUBLE LIFE (1994); JOHN M. CAHER, KING OF THE MOUNTAIN: THE RISE, FALL,
AND REDEMPTION OF CHIEF JUDGE SOL WACHTLER (1998).
110. See Moore, 307 N.E.2d at 558 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
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Assembly and State Senate, as well as due to the shadow of then-
governor Malcolm Wilson, a Republican who was likely to veto any
class action bill. Republican legislators identified with the concerns
of retailers, insurers, and bankers, who dreaded the thought of class
action litigation creating significant legal costs and potential liability due
to modest overcharges or improprieties.112
Although the Moore opinion's call to action put some additional
wind in the sails of reformers and resulted in a significant effort to enact
a modern class action law during the 1974 legislative session, the same
political factors remained at work. Governor Wilson and the Republican
leadership again prevented passage, albeit in part through the procedural
gambit of barring a printing of the proposed bill so that it could not be
brought before the full Assembly for consideration.113 Then came the
November 1974 elections where, as elsewhere, the Nixon
Administration's Watergate scandal, culminating in President Richard
Nixon's August 1974 resignation and new President Gerald Ford's
unpopular pardon of Nixon, fueled substantial Democratic gains across
the country.11 4  In New York, this meant a Democratic takeover of the
11l. See Linda Greenhouse, Passage Seen for a Class-Action Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1975,
at 290 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Passage Seen for a Class-Action Bill] ("Last year, a strong class-
action bill died in both houses of the Legislature without reaching the floor, after intense lobbying
by banking and business groups. [Republican] Governor [Malcom] Wilson made no secret of his
dislike for the concept, and [Republican] Senator H. Douglas Barclay, chairman of the Senate Codes
Committee, where the strong bill was assigned, countered it with a version of his own that consumer
groups denounced as worse than no bill at all.... Governor Carey urged the passage of a class-
action bill . . ..") (noting significant support for bill from some Republican legislators); Linda
Greenhouse, Class Action, and How It Came to Nothing in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1974, at
187 [hereinafter Greenhouse, How It Came to Nothing in Albany, N. Y] (discussing politics of class
action legislative proposal, including Democratic support and Republican opposition. "What
happened to the bill is 'a classic study of what real lobbying is all about,' in the words of James T.
Prendergast, a lawyer who lobbied on the losing side for consumer assembly."); James Klurfeld,
Lobbyist Campaign Stalls Consumer Bill in Albany, THE HERALD STATESMAN (Watertown, N.Y.),
Apr. 13, 1974, at 1; Linda Greenhouse, Consumers'Class-Action Bill Argued, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1974, at 33 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Consumers' Class-Action Bill Argued] (noting academic
proponents of class action similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and resistance or opposition by Republican
legislators and business groups).
112. See supra note 111.
113. See Greenhouse, Consumers' Class-Action Bill Argued, supra note 111, at 33.
114. See Laura Kalman, Gerald Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and the Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 349 (2010) (describing Watergate-related upheavals of 1974 politics); Joseph A.
McCartin, Unexpected Convergence: Values, Assumptions, and the Right to Strike in Public and
Private Sectors, 1945-2005, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 727 (2009 ) (describing huge Democratic victory in
Watergate-influenced elections of 1974); J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 705 (2008) (referring to "Democratic
sweep in the 1974 'Watergate election'); David S. Law & Lawrence Solum, Positive Political
Theory and the Law: Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J.
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Assembly and Senate and the replacement of Wilson with liberal
Democrat Hugh Carey as governor. 5
B. The Path of Class Action Legislation and the Derivation of CPLR §
901(b) 's Limitation on Penalty Class Actions
Class action reform suddenly had renewed momentum. Proponents
reintroduced legislation in the 1975 session, putting forth a bill that
would largely adopt the federal model. 116  However, in some ways the
proposed New York law was even more plaintiff and class treatment
friendly than Federal Rule 23 in that it contained a relaxed provision
regarding notice in actions seeking payment of damages to class
members Federal Rule 23(b)(3) (class actions in federal jargon),
allowing the judge to dispense with the inconvenience and expense of
mailing individualized notice to class members.11 7 As before, the 1975
proposal had widespread support from the academy, the judiciary,
consumer groups, and political liberals. Opposition predictably came
from political conservatives and business interests and perhaps
surprisingly from some elements of the organized bar who saw the
coercive impact of the class device as outweighing its ability to help
society's "little guys" from righting little wrongs perpetrated profitably
en mass by commercial entities.1 18
CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 51, 83 (2006) (same); David R. LaGassee, Note, Undue Influence:
Corporate Political Speech, Power and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1347, 1356
(1995) (noting that the 1974 election big was a win for liberal reformers).
115. See Betsy Buechner, Consumer Groups Seek Big Albany Gains, THE HERALD
STATESMAN (Watertown, N.Y.), Jan. 10, 1975, at 23 [hereinafter Buechner, Consumer Groups See
Big Albany Gains] (noting shift to Democratic control of legislature and replacement of Republican
Wilson with Democrat Carey was seen as positive by consumer groups seeking to enact class action
bill and other pro-consumer legislation). See also Alfonso A. Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits
Passed by the Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1975, at 39 [hereinafter Narvaez, Bill to Aid
Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature] (noting support for bill among consumer, liberal, and
Democratic constituencies and opposition in Republican, business, and conservative quarters.
116. See sources cited in supra note 111.
117. See Greenhouse, How It Came to Nothing in Albany, N.Y, supra note 111, at 290 (noting
relaxed notice requirements of original bill and revised bill providing for greater notice but court
discretion in application); Greenhouse, Consumers' Class-Action Bill Argued, at 33 (noting that
conservative alternative to original bill offered by prominent Republican Senator would "for
example, require all potential members of the class to be notified of the lawsuit and would require
each plaintiff to show that he had suffered damages before he could share in the judgment").
118. See articles cited in supra notes 111-18. There historically has been some division of bar
organizations in New York. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, headquartered in
Midtown Manhattan, is heavily comprised, as its name implies, of urban practitioners. In addition,
many or most of the members and the bulk of the leadership is comprised of lawyers in prestigious
commercial firms or alumni of such firms. It is commonly described as the "Ivy League" bar, the
"white shoe" bar or the "liberal establishment" in that it tends to be more politically liberal,
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Assembly Speaker Stanley Fink, a Brooklyn Democrat, was lead
sponsor of the bill, joined by more than fifty co-sponsors.] It passed
the Assembly (by a 138 to 5 vote) on February 10, 1975.120 The Senate
returned the bill for reconsideration in May, where the amended
legislation was again passed (by a vote of 146 to 0)121 and processed
through the Senate, reaching final enactment on May 28.12 After
transmittal to the governor, the bill was signed into law on June 17,
1975.123 The resulting product was a state class action provision that
looks like Federal Rule 23, but with a limitation on actions seeking
penalties. The process by which the final bill and this limitation
emerged provides an additional window on the federal-state tussle
reflected in Shady Grove.
Despite pushback from bill opponents, which resulted in § 901(b)'s
limitation on class actions enforcing statutory penalties, the resulting
legislation was still arguably more pro-plaintiff, pro-class, and "liberal"
than Federal Rule 23. As noted in the Attorney General's Memorandum
to Governor Carey regarding the bill,
Section 904 gives the court great discretion in determining the content
and method of notice to the class and also permits the court to hold
preliminary hearings in order to determine how the costs [of] notice
need not be given in class actions brought primarily for injunctive or
declaratory relief (where the plaintiff is in essence acting as a "private
attorney general"). Section 904 also gives the court discretion to allow
the prevailing party the expenses of notice as taxable disbursements
under 904 for the discretionary award of attorneys' fees to the people
academic in orientation, and national or international in its focus than the New York State Bar
(headquartered in Albany), whose membership and leadership reflect considerably more upstate,
small town and suburban roots as well a more conservative, pro-business focus. See JEFFREY B.
MORRIS, MAKING SURE WE ARE TRUE TO OUR FOUNDERS: THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 1970-95 (1997). For example, the City Bar publically opposed the nomination
of conservative D.C. Circuit Judge and former Yale and Chicago law professor Robert Bork. See
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors ofScope, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 529, 632, n.473 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Hearings: Legal Establishment
Divided Over Bork Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987, at 33. See also MICHAEL PERTSCHUK
& WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION
(1989).
119. See Assembly Bill 1252-B, addressed in New York Legislative Service, Inc., NYLS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ch. 207 (1975) [hereinafter NYLS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (on file with
author) (including Governor's Bill Jacket). Fink continued in the legislature for nearly another
twenty years, rising to become speaker and becoming one of New York's most powerful politicians.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id
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with small individual damages and poor financial resources to make
greater use of the class action in order to redress common class
.. 124injuries.
Although federal courts have the discretionary power to achieve
similar results, both the language of current Federal Rule 23 and long-
standing interpretation of the 1966 version of the Rule that inspired the
New York law, create a strong presumption that individual notice to
class members is required in Federal Rule 23(b)(3) damages class
actions, with plaintiff bearing responsibility for the costs of notice, at
least in first instance.125 Governor Carey was made quite aware of this
by his Attorney General:
Not only does the bill now make class action procedures in New York
similar to the federal procedures, its treatment of the issue of notice
avoids the problems that continue to beset federal practice as a result
of last year's U.S. Supreme Court decision in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156.
I have advocated revision of the class action statute in this fashion
for many years, having submitted a brief to the New York State Court
of Appeals in 1969 as amicus curiae in the case of Hall v. Coburn, 226
N.Y.2d 396. My amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Eisen case supported the same treatment of notice as that provided by
this bill.126
Nowhere in his memorandum assessing the bill does the Attorney
General mention § 901(b)'s prohibition on class actions regarding
statutory penalties. Similarly, the Memorandum of the Governor filed
with the Assembly makes no mention of the limitation on statutory
penalty class actions.127 Neither does the Lieutenant Governor's
Counsel's Memorandum to the Governor's Counsel.128 In general, the
bill was presented upon passage as an unalloyed good but described only
in general terms, with little or no discussion of the areas in which the
124. Memorandum for the Governor [Hugh Carey] of Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz
(June 4, 1975), at 1-2 (on file with author).
125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See also
Miller, supra note 100.
126. See Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 124, at 2 (underlining in original).
127. See Memorandum filed with Assembly Bill Number 1252-B (date not included on
memorandum), signed by Governor Hugh Carey, available in "Bill Jacket" for the class action law.
See NYLS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 119, ch. 207 (page 9 of compilation).
128. See Memorandum from Robert J. Dryfoos, Counsel to the Lieutenant Governor to Judah
Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (June 9, 1975) (on file with author).
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original 1 roposal had been cut back to accommodate business interest
groups.
But, as with all legislation, there was a backstory in which interests
opposing the bill pushed back, with mixed success in the matter of class
action legislation. During the 1974 legislative session during which the
proposal died and the 1975 session leading to passage, debate over the
class action bill was confined to the overall merits of aggregation in the
abstract, i.e., whether permitting collective claims was in itself a wise
idea empowering those suffering little wrongs or a foolish idea enabling
voracious plaintiffs' lawyers to extort businesses over minor errors.
In addition, there was public discussion of the means of measuring
damages in class action matters, in particular whether "fluid" recovery
or market share liability concepts could be used to compensate plaintiffs
in cases where it was difficult or impossible to determine the identity of
those wronged by an improper business practice. 131
129. See, e.g., Letter from Assemblyman Stanley Fink to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel
(June 2, 1975) (on file with author) (making no mention of limitation on class actions for statutory
penalties or derivation of the restriction); Memorandum from State Consumer Protection Board to
Governor's Counsel (May 29, 1975) (on file with author) (describing new law as "based largely on
the procedure used in federal class actions" but an "improve[ment] on the federal procedure": in
that it avoids the Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin jurisprudence by authorizing notices by publication
and "permits random sampling of the class to determine the need for individual notice, allows the
court to require the defendant to pay for part or all of the costs of notice, and permits the court to
hold a preliminary hearing on the merits to determine how the costs of notice should be
apportioned." (endnote omitted)). The Consumer Protection Board Memorandum, supra, addresses
§ 901 [b] simply by summarizing it and arguably understates its limiting effect, noting that "of
course, if the members of a class who would be entitled to a penalty sue only for their actual
damages, they may do so in a class action," an observation that tends to overlook the difficulties of
proof and possibly low incentive to sue even with the benefit of the class action device.
130. See articles cited in supra notes 111-18.
131. See Linda Greenhouse, State Senate Unit Expected to Recommend New Bill Allowing
Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1974, at 13 [hereinafter Greenhouse, State Senate Unit
Expected to Recommend New Bill Allowing Class-Action Suits]. "Fluid recovery" as the term was
used in press accounts envisions a situation in which it is clear that consumers were harmed by
wrongdoing but under circumstances where there was no paper trail and where it was unlikely or
unwieldy for consumers to come forward and demonstrate their participation in the wrongful
transactions. The example used was of a cab company with a meter that charged excessive rates.
Because most passengers then usually paid cash, identifying and notifying those harmed was
difficulty, expensive, or perhaps impossible. The passengers themselves would be unlikely to
realize that they had been swindled absent notice. The fluid recovery damages solution would
require the taxi company to reduce its charges going forward until the amount of the overcharges
had been repaid to the company's patrons. See id. I analogize this form of recovery for the group to
market share liability in tort law in which a plaintiff harmed by a product made by several
manufactures may obtain proportional repayment according to the defendants' market share when
the plaintiff is unable to identify the specific drug or blasting cap that caused injury. See, e.g., Hall
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (Weinstein, J.) (blasting
caps); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (DES pharmaceutical product).
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One might consider Section § 901(b)'s ban on class actions for
statutory penalties to be a subset of the larger debate over aggregation
generally. Nonetheless, it appears that there was not a single mention of
this limitation, proposed by opponents of the bill seeking to salve the
pain of defeat, in any popular press reports-during either 1974 or
1975-regarding class action legislation and the public policy issues
surrounding the legislation.132 In other words, even politically interested
laypersons outside the immediate circle of legislating likely had no idea
that the original bill contained no such limitation and that the restriction
came about silently and without any serious debate over the matter by
political elites.
Proposals to carve out statutory penalty litigation from the new
class action law began to surface during spring 1975 as various interest
groups registered their expected opposition. The New York State Bar
Association, in expressing its "disapproval" of the bill, as it had done
with similar predecessor legislation, stated that § 901 regarding
"prerequisites to a class action" should "contain a separate subdivision
(b)" that would read:
132. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Consumers' Class-Action Bill Argued, supra note 11l, at 33;
Consumers' Groups Attack Barclay 'Class-Action'Bill, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, Mar. 11, 1974,
at 9; Linda Greenhouse, State Senate Unit Expected to Recommend New Bill Allowing Class-Action
Suits, supra note 131; Barclay Commends Public Service Department at Recognition Dinner, THE
TRIBUNE-PRESS (Gouverneur, N.Y.), Apr. 10, 1974, at 1; Klurfeld, supra note 111, at 1; Class
Action Law Unlikely This Year, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, Apr. 30, 1974, at 16; Class Action Law
Dies in Albany, ADIRONDACK DAILY ENTERPRISE (Saranac Lake, N.Y.), May 1, 1974, at 5;
Greenhouse, Class Action, and How It Came to Nothing in Albany, supra note I 11, at 187;
Candidates Heat Up Campaigning, The Daily Press, Oct. 26, 1974, at 17; Betsy Buechner, Albany
Warming to Consumer Activists, THE OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y.), Jan. 9, 1975, at 23;
Buechner, Consumer Groups Seek Big Albany Gains, supra note 115, at 17; Senator Reintroduces
Class Action Measure, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, Jan. 21, 1975, at 11; Greenhouse, Passage Seen
for a Class-Action Bill, supra note 111, at 29; Narvaez, Local Veto Voted on OTB Parlors, supra
note 103, at 46; Class-Action Suit Bill Gets Assembly OK, PRESS-REPUBLICAN, Feb. 11, 1975, at 25;
Assembly Approves New Consumer Aid, THE HERALD STATESMAN (Yonkers, N.Y.), Feb. 11, 1975,
at 2; Assembly Passes Consumer-Protection Bill, Utica NY DAILY PRESS, Feb. 11, 1975; David
Shaffer, Assembly Passes by 140-5 Vote Key Consumer-Protection Bill, SCHENECTADY GAZETTE,
Feb. 11, 1975, at 44; Paul Harenberg, Hometown Report, SUFFOLK COUNTY NEWS, Feb. 27, 1975,
at 13; Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature, supra note 115, at 39; Paul J.
Browne, Class Action Bill Passed by Senate, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, May 29, 1975, at 11;
Christine McKnight, Consumer Legislation an Exception in Divided House, UTICA NY DAILY
PRESS, 1975; Carey Okay Predicted for 'Class Action Bill', THE CITIZEN-ADVERTISER (Auburn,
N.Y.), May 29, 1975, at 2; Legislature Passes 'Class Action 'Bill, ADIRONDACK DAILY ENTERPRISE
(Saranac Lake, N.Y.), June 2, 1975, at 2; Paul Harenberg, Hometown Report, SUFFOLK COUNTY
NEWS, June 5, 1975, at 17; Milton Hoffman, Albany Legislation: Lot Getting Done, THE HERALD
STATESMAN (Yonkers, N.Y.), June 25, 1975; State Legislature Leaves 'Slim' Legacy, THE
OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y.), July 13, 1975, at 2A; Benjamin P. Roosa Jr., Assembly Report,
THE HARLEM VALLEY TIMES, Sept. 4, 1975, at 4.
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Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, forfeiture or minimum
measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a
class action, an action to recover a penalty, forfeiture or minimum
measure of recovery created or imposed by statue may not be
maintained as a class action.133
The rationale for the Bar's position was that New York law
Contains many "penalty" and similar provisions establishing arbitrary
measures of liability for noncompliance which, although appropriate
for individual actions, would lead to excessively harsh results in large
class actions. The amounts of those penalties were established at
levels sufficient to provide incentives for individual suits and it would
be a ross distortion of their purpose to permit their recovery in class
suits.
Other business-affiliated interest groups also supported the
statutory penalty carve out as a means of making the class action more
palatable, although none offered to support the legislation in return for
the limit on statutory penalty class actions.135 Simultaneously, groups
133. See N. Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Banking Law, Business Law and Civil Practice
Law and Rules, Legislative Report No. 15 (1975) (on file with author) (regarding S.1309 (proposed
by Barclay), A. 1252 (proposed by Fink), A1417 (proposed by Jonas); S. 1360 (proposed by
Dunne), A. 1330 (proposed by Fink), S. 1251 (proposed by Dunne) (undated), at 2) (all various
forms of the essentially similar class action bill favored by consumer groups)). Accord N.Y. State
Bar Association Committees on Banking Law, Business Law Legislative Report No. 4 (Apr. 7,
1975) (on file with author); N.Y. State Bar Association Committees on Banking Law, Legislative
Report No. I (undated) (on file with author).
134. N. Y. State Bar Assoc. Legislative Report No. 15 (1975) (on file with author) (regarding
S.1309 (proposed by Barclay), A. 1252 (proposed by Fink), A1417 (proposed by Jonas), S. 1360
(proposed by Dunne), A. 1330 (proposed by Fink), S. 1251 (proposed by Dunne), at 2 (all various
forms of the essentially similar class action bill favored by consumer groups)) (transmitted via
Letter of June 5, 1975 from John I. Vanderploog, Legislative Representative, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
to Judah Gribetz). See also materials adjacent to Letter from Donald A. Walsh, Counsel, N.Y.
Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials to Judah Gribetz (June 16, 1975) (on file with
author) in legislative history, stating:
Penalties make it worthwhile for people to pursue their rights in court, and costly for
defendants to violate the law. Class actions do the same thing. When lumped together,
penalties and class actions produce overkill by magnifying potential liability wildly out
of proportion to any possible wrong. in one case a defendant was asked to pay $130
million dollars for a violation which the judge called debatable and which caused no
actual damages to anybody.
Id.
135. See, e.g., Letter from Sanford H. Bolz, General Counsel, Empire State Chamber of
Commerce, to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel (June 4, 1975) and accompanying Memorandum
in Opposition to A. 1252 (proposed by Fink) and S. 1309 (proposed by Barclay), at 3 [hereinafter
Bolz Letter of June 4, 1975] (on file with author) (contending that "Recovery of Penalties Should
Be Prohibited"). See also Letter from Donald A. Walsh, Counsel, N.Y. Conference of Mayors and
Mun. Officials to Judah Gribetz (June 16, 1975) (on file with author) (criticizing "vague" language
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supporting the bill registered their approval of the legislation but did not
comment on the issue of limits on statutory penalty class actions. 136In
and "wide-open approach" of bill and expressing fear of "rash of suits" interfering with municipal
actions but making no specific mention of statutory penalties); Letter from Welles A. Gray,
Legislative Representative, Associated Credit Bureaus of N.Y. State and N.Y. Unit, American
Collectors Assoc., to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel (June 9 1975) (on file with author)
(attacking several aspects of bill but making no mention of statutory penalties); Letter from
Clarence E. Galston, Exec. Vice President, Assoc. of N.Y. State Life Ins. Co., to Judah Gribetz,
Governor's Counsel (June 5, 1975), at 1 (on file with author) (opposing bill because of failure to
limit recovery to "actual damages sustained by identifiable people" but failing to address issues of
penalty class actions); Letter from Gary J. Perkinson, Executive Dir., N.Y. State Council of Retail
Merch., Inc. to Judah Gribetz (June 4, 1975) (on file with author); Letter from Joseph R. Shaw,
President, Associated Indust. of N.Y. State, Inc., to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel (June 3,
1975) (on file with author) (expressing general opposition to class action law without specific
discussion of § 901[b]); Memorandum to the Legislature, N.Y. Chamber of Commerce & Indust.
(Feb. 3, 1975) (on file with author) (opposing bill in general as permitting "legalized blackmail" but
making no specific mention of statutory penalties).
In his letter, Chamber of Commerce Counsel Bolz made clear that the Chamber opposed
the class action bill even with the inclusion of the penalty limitation:
Of the six reasonable amendments which we, along with the New York State Council of
Retail Merchants and a combination of three committees of the New York State Bar
Association, suggested that would make the bill acceptable, four were ignored. Only (1)
a ban on recovery of statutory penalties was adopted-and only a feeble pass was made
at (2) an essential limitation on attorneys' fees-by limiting them to the "reasonable
value of the legal services rendered" instead of, as we urged to "the number of hours
reasonably expended . .. at a fair hourly rate." Beyond that, there was no concession
made to our further requests for (3) individual notice to reasonably identifiable members
of the class in damage cases, (4) notice expenses to be borne by plaintiffs except in
extraordinary circumstances, (5) limitation of recoveries to actual damages sustained by
identifiable people and not "fluid recoveries," and (6) discretion to the judge to
determine whether class members should be required to assent to be included ("opt-in")
or be included unless they signify dissent ("opt-out").
See Bolz Letter of June 4, 1975, supra, at 1.
136. See, e.g., Memorandum from Keneth P. Norwick, Legislative Dir., N.Y. Civil Liberties
Union to Judah Gribetz (June 19, 1975) (on file with author); Letter from Joseph T. Weingold,
Exec. Dir., N. Y. State Assoc. for Retarded Children, to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel (June 9,
1975) (on file with author); Telegram from Abraham Fuchsberg, Chair, Legislative Comm., N.Y.
State Trial Lawyers Assoc. (June 6, 1975) (on file with author); Letter from Stephen Shestakofsky,
Legislative Representative, Citizens Union of the City of N. Y., to Judah Gribetz, Governor's
Counsel (June 6, 1975) (on file with author) (making no specific mention of statutory penalty class
actions but noting that "[i]ndividual actions are often too costly for a single consumer to bring. The
final award is usually more than offset by the cost of the litigation itself."); Letter from Luther
Gatling, Comty Service Soc'y, to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel (June 3, 1975) (on file with
author); Recommendation of Citizens Union of the City of N. Y. (week of May 27, 1975) (on file
with author); Legislative Memorandum from Robert T. Cobb, Assoc. Exec. Dir., N. Y. State
Council of Churches (Feb. 11, 1975) (on file with author). See also Letter from George L. Graff,
Chair, Comm. on State Legislation, and Rhoda Karpatkin, Chair, Special Comm. on Consumer
Affairs, Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N. Y., to Judah Gribetz, Governor's Counsel (June 11,
1975), at 1 (on file with author) (apparently accepting limitation on statutory penalty class actions as
part of final legislation). The Association's Committee on Civil Practice Laws and Rules had in
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general, proponents of the reform stressed the impracticality of
vindicating rights for small wrongs, even systematic small wrongs, in
the absence of a modem class action device akin to Federal Rule 23
rather than the old New York CPLR § 1005, which drastically limited
the availability of the class action.137 Passage and enactment of the new
law was portrayed in the popular press as a great victory for consumers
with relatively little discussion of the arguments of the law's opponents
and no discussion of the separate status of statutory penalties. 38
C. The Almost Invisible Debased Non-Debate Over CPLR § 901(b)139
Throughout the legislative history of the class action law, there
appears to have been little serious and sustained discussion of the issue
of statutory penalty class actions. In particular, there appears to have
been little serious examination of, or debate over, the rationale put forth
in support of the limitation. 140 In addition to New York Bar Legislative
1972 issued a Committee Report critical of class actions but did not specifically address statutory
penalties.
The Reports of the Administrative Boards of the Judicial Conference for the relevant time
periods discuss the basic arguments for or against class actions but contain no express examination
of the issue of statutory penalty class actions and appears not to have considered this cutback as a
possible modification of the class action reform generally supported by the Conference.
137. See, e.g., Special Comm. on Consumer Affairs, Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Proposed Class Action Legislation in N.Y. (on file with author) (reviewing history of class actions
generally and in New York, California experience with liberalized class actions, rationale for and
criticisms of class actions, strongly concluding that state law should follow approach of FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 making class actions more available; no mention of statutory penalty issue in majority
Report, dissenting statements, or supplementary views).
138. See, e.g., Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature, supra note 115,
at 39. See also supra note 132.
139. With apologies to Marc Galanter, although I find the analogy to § 901(b) and Professor
Galanter's phraseology too apt to forgo. See Marc Galanter, News From Nowhere: The Debased
Debate Over Civil Justice, 71 DENv. U. L. REv. 77 (1993).
140. But see Letter from Adolf Homburger, Chair, Comm. to Advise and Consult with the
Judicial Conference of the State of New York on Civil Practice Law and Rules, to Judah Gribetz,
Governor's Counsel (June 6, 1975) (on file with author). Professor Homburger notes that the final
legislation differs from the initial bill recommended by the Judicial Conference in that it contains
the § 901[b] statutory penalty prohibition and in § 902 "requires that the plaintiff within a specified
time after joinder of issue move for permission to maintain the action as a class action" while the
original bill required the defendant to move for dismissal of a putative class action. In addition, §
904 of the final bill "contains a far more elaborate notification scheme than the original bill" but one
regarded as "in harmony with the general intent of the bill as originally drafted." Id.
According to Homburger, "none [of these] changes affect the main thrust of the bill. They
were carefully considered and approved by the Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference."
Id. at 1. However, no written record of any Advisory Committee deliberations is found in the
official legislative history or appears to have been independently published. A contemporaneous
letter states that the Judicial Conference found amendments to the original bill, implicitly including
the statutory penalty prohibition, "unobjectionable" except for concern over the clarity of language
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Report 15 cited above, the most extensive discussion of the matter by the
legislation's opponents is found in the Chamber of Commerce
Memorandum to the Governor's Counsel:
A class action statute should limit any monetary recovery sought to the
actual damages sustained.
The purpose of penalty provisions in individual actions envisioned in
State and Federal law is to encourage wronged individuals and their
attorneys to pursue their claims by creating a sufficient amount in
controversy to ensure economic incentive. Statutory penalties and
minimum recoveries which are necessary in individual actions are not
necessary in class actions, where the aggregate damage claims are
large and sufficient, in and of themselves, to support litigation.
Penalties and class actions simply do not mix. This was proved in
Ratner v. Chemical Bank, a case under the Federal Rules where the
combination caused a potential liability of $130,000,000 although the
actual damages to individual plaintiffs were zero!
This injustice could be remedied by adding subsection B to Section
901, to provide that unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty or
other minimum recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in
a class action, an action to recovery such a penalty or minimum
recovery created or imposed by such statute may not be maintained as
a class action.141
In response to the lobbying of the bill's opponents arguing for the
statutory penalty ban as a means of making the legislation less onerous,
the bill's proponents seemed to have accepted the anti-penalty
arguments with surprisingly little resistance. For example,
regarding class action motion practice but provides no discussion of the penalty issue. See Letter
from Richard A. Bartlett to Judah Gribetz 1 (June 3, 1975). The Judicial Conference Memorandum
regarding the original bill does not discuss statutory penalties. See also Letter from Jay Cox
O'Brien, Assistant Dir., N.Y. State Law Revision Commission, to Judah Gribetz and accompanying
memorandum (June 2, 1975) (noting changes from initial bill that "now appears to meet most of the
objections to class action bills filed by bar associations over the past several years" but providing no
specific discussion of statutory penalties or other areas of conflict or amendment).
Notwithstanding the Judicial Conference's seeming tacit support for the statutory penalty
prohibition, it appears that class action proponents neither seriously assessed nor publically debated
the wisdom of adding this limitation to the final bill. See infra note 146-52 and accompanying text.
141. Empire State Chamber of Commerce, Memorandum in Opposition to A. 1252 (proposed
by Fink) and S. 1309 (proposed by Barclay), at 3 (underlining in original) (on file with author)
(contending that "Recovery of Penalties Should Be Prohibited").
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Assemblyman Stanley Fink, a liberal Democratic activist who would
eventually become Speaker, stated:
[The final legislation] [p]recludes a class action based on a statute
creating or imposing a penalty or minimum measure of recovery unless
the specific statute allows for a class action. These penalties or
"minimum damages" are provided as a means of encouraging suits
where the amounts involved might otherwise be too small. Where a
class action is brought, this additional encouragement is not necessary.
A statutory class action for actual damages would still be
permissible.142
Floor debates on the new law were no more probing on the issue of
whether statutory penalties were so different from ordinary class action
cases to merit prohibition. In floor debate just prior to passage in the
Senate, sponsor Senator Barclay (R-Pulaski) noted:
[The final bill] has been amended from its original version to exclude
statutory penalties and minimum measures of recovery from class
actions unless the statue creating a penalty or minimum measure of
recovery specifically authorized the remedy thereof. Spokesmen for
many groups at the public hearing acknowledged that the imposition of
penalties which would be appropriate when applied in an individual
action would produce excessively harsh results when you magnify the
impact in a class suit.
Nevertheless, this amended bill recognizes the power of the
Legislature to exact penalty provision which are appropriate in class
action context and leaves the door open for the recovery of such
penalties in class actions if the Legislature specifically so provides.' 43
There appears to have been no other significant discussion of the
matter during floor debate, although Senator Barclay alluded to
commentary at a public hearing on the bill for which there appears to
exist no available transcribed record or docket. As previously noted,
popular press reports regarding the class action law did not address the
issue of statutory penalties.144 The one excerpt of floor debate that made
the news would likely be interpreted by reasonable readers as suggesting
that the new law did indeed encompass statutory penalties as well as
other forms of damages:
142. See Memorandum by Stanley Fink regarding A. 1252 and S. 1309 (final class action
legislation), at 2 (on file with author).
143. See Transcript of Proceedings, N.Y. State Senate (May 28, 1975), at S946-S947 (remarks
of Senator Barclay).
144. See supra note 132.
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Only Senator Richard E. Schemerhorn, Republican of Cornwall-
on-Hudson, spoke out against the bill. He asked if one consumer who
was defrauded by a store was victorious in a lawsuit and was awarded
damages, would all other customers who had purchased the item be
entitled to similar awards.
When he was told that they would be so entitled, he said "I'm
against class action." He voted against the bill.
The New York Consumer Assembly called passage of the measure
"one of the jreatest steps for consumer justice ever taken by this
Legislature."
The Practice Commentary to the Act, upon which the Shady Grove
dissent heavily (and perhaps excessively) relied in assessing the
legislative history of § 901(b) notes:
[The] Judicial Conference proposal for the adoption of Article 9 did
not contain subdivision (b) of CPLR § 901. The Legislature added the
provision, apparently fearing that class judgments awarding statutory
penalty-type damages to each member of the class would result in
"annihilating punishment" of the defendant. See Ratner v. Chemical
Bank ofNew York, S.D.N.Y. 1972, 54 F.R.D. 412, 416. Thus, CPLR §
901(b) generally prohibits class certification of claims that seek
recovery of a "penalty or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute. On the other hand, certification is allowed if the
statute creating the penalty or minimum recovery specifically allows
for class recovery. For example, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2801-d
authorizes both a minimum monetary recovery and punitive damages
in private litigation against nursing homes for inadequate provision of
services, explicitly stating that a class action is permitted. Id. §2801-
d(4).14
The Practice Commentary, with its quotation from Ratner v.
Chemical Bank, clearly served as a core component of Justice
Ginsburg's Shady Grove dissent, which cited the "annihilating
punishment" phrase and accepted as accurate the Commentary's
summary of the genesis of § 901(b)'s limitation on class actions.148 But
145. See Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature, supra note 115
(noting favorable comments about new law suggesting no subject matter or substantive restrictions
on use of class actions).
146. See infra note 148 and accompanying text, (discussing the Shady Grove Court's
oversimplified and arguably misleading version of§ 901(b)'s legislative history).
147. See Vincent Alexander, Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901.
148. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1464
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Aiming to avoid 'annihilating punishment of the defendant,' the
New York Legislature amended the proposed statute to bar the recovery of statutory damages in
2011] SHADY GROVE 947
HeinOnline  -- 44 Akron L. Rev. 947 2011
AKRON LAW REVIEW
the phrase appears nowhere in the official bill jacket for the law or in the
class actions." (citing Vincent Alexander, Practice Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B
MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK, ANN. 104 (2006)). A review of the Bill Jacket
for the new class action law, however, nowhere reflects the legislature using these particularly
loaded words. The closest the official legislative history gets is in the two references in interest
group submissions to Ratner v. Chemical Bank of New York, 54 F.R.D. 412, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
where the trial court uses this phrase in refusing to certify a TILA class action notwithstanding the
absence of an express prohibition on class treatment of such claims in FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
And, notwithstanding the adage that those in glass houses should not throw stones, I find
the Shady Grove dissent's slavish reliance on the Practice Commentaries (following the New York
Court of Appeals similar deference in Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E. 2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y.
2007) puzzling and unjustified. Although Practice Commentaries and similar glosses included in
statutory compilations and annotations can be important helpful materials for attorneys conducting
research they are, to perhaps state the obvious, not the actual statute or legislative history. The
Practice Commentary to § 901(b), in particular, seems essentially to rely only upon Sperry v.
Crompton. There is no indication that the Practice Commentary examined the full legislative
history materials or bill jacket. The Sperry opinion itself does not reflect any particularly
comprehensive review or critical assessment of the genesis of § 901(b).
Vincent C. Alexander, the author of the Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b),
is a long-time professor at St. John's Law School in New York, whose principal writings are the
Practice Commentaries to various sections of the New York laws, an Evidence treatise, and a well-
cited law review article. See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191 (1989) (cited in more than eighty law review
articles and in Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 524 U.S. 339 (1998) (holding that attorney-client privilege
survives death of client, in that case former Clinton Justice Department official Vincent Foster, who
had committed suicide and who had come within the scope of the Whitewater investigation).
Professor Alexander was born in 1949 and became a lawyer in 1975, the year of the
enactment of New York class action legislation that had been developing over the prior three years.
There is no indication that he worked for the legislature or otherwise participated in the process.
His ability to characterize the legislative history of the bill thus would seem no better than mine or
that of other observers distant in space and time, who must depend on the Bill Jacket, news accounts
of the era, and perhaps interviews (although there is no indication that this was done as part of the
Practice Commentaries). In all likelihood, he relied exclusively on the description of § 901(b)'s
background contained in Sperry v. Crompton, which appeared not to have delved much into the
almost casual manner in which the sections limitations were grafted onto the bill. Although not
exactly a house of cards, neither is this much foundation for maintaining that § 901(b) is central to
New York's substantive law.
As noted above, an examination of the Bill Jacket and newspaper reports of the period
hardly suggests the uniform swell of policymaker opinion as fearful of large statutory penalty class
actions reflected in Ratner v. Chemical Bank, Sperry v. Crompton, or the Shady Grove dissent. The
actual legislative history should a much stealthier, unexplored amendment weakening the class
action bill well out of sight of the general public which, as far as I can determine, never even had a
chance to read about the interest group lobbying for § 901(b) until it was a fait accompli. Without
doubt, there was no meaningful public debate on the wisdom of § 901(b).
Under these circumstances, the Practice Commentary is certainly incomplete and arguably
misleading, as is the Sperry v. Crompton description of § 901(b)'s genesis. It is troubling that the
highest court in the nation's fourth largest state and four Justices of the nation's highest court were
so quick to embrace what appears to be a superficial assessment of the section as the definitive word
on § 901(b)'s legislative history. A more accurate and nuanced "telling" of the § 901(b) story (see
Shady Grove dissent, 130 S. Ct. at 1464) ("the story behind § 901(b)'s enactment deserves telling")
reveals substantial problems with the Sperry v. Crompton and Practice Commentary account.
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Legislative Service's formal compilation of legislative history, although
Ratner is noted by proponents of § 901(b) as an example of the in
terrorem effect of statutory penalty class actions.
Reading only the Shady Grove dissent, one could get the
misleading impression that § 901(b) emerged from a civics textbook
example of deliberative democracy in action. The dissent's argument
that "[t]he story behind § 901(b)'s enactment deserves telling" 49s
correct. Unfortunately, however, the dissent misleadingly portrayed this
gritty exercise of legislative sausage-making in fairy tale fashion. The
dissent begins innocently (but incompletely) enough, noting that in
1975, the Judicial Conference of the State of New York proposed a new
class-action statute designed to "set up a flexible, functional scheme"
that would provide "an effective, but controlled group remedy."15 0 The
statement is true but incomplete in that it omits any discussion of the
years of effort preceding the 1975 legislative success and the steady rear
guard actions against the law waged by vested special interests that
feared the empowerment of consumers. 1 It also bears noting that the
Judicial Conference, hardly a radical group of Marxists intent on
pillaging legitimate businesses, thought the original bill was "controlled"
enough in its remedy without any limitation on statutory penalty class
actions.152 Indeed, the model for the original New York class action
proposal was Federal Rule 23, a rule that is considered sufficiently
"controlled" by most of the legal world, notwithstanding criticisms of
class action abuses.
The dissent's oversimplified view becomes more apparent in the
next paragraph as it accepts as Gospel what might be termed the "Cliff
Notes" history of the law contained in a single Court of Appeals decision
and the McKinney's Practice Commentary to the resulting statute.
While the Judicial Conference proposal was in the New York
Legislature's hopper, "various groups advocated for the addition of a
provision that would prohibit class action plaintiffs from being
awarded a statutorily-created penalty . . . except when expressly
authorized in the pertinent statute." [citing Sperry v. Crompton Corp.,
8 N.Y.3d 204, 211 (2007).] These constituents "feared that recoveries
beyond actual damages could lead to excessively harsh results." "They
149. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464.
150. See id. at 1464.
151. See supra text and accompanying notes Section III.A.
152. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (originally proposed class action bill,
through several legislative sessions, contained no statutory penalty limitation, suggesting that legal
experts crafting the bill saw no basis for such a restriction).
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also argued that there was no need to permit class actions . . . [because]
statutory penalties . . . provided an aggrieved party with a sufficient
economic incentive to pursue a claim." Such penalties, constituents
observed, often far exceed a plaintiffs actual damages. "When
lumped together," they argued, "penalties and class actions produce
overkill." [citing to letter from Retail Merchants, Inc. to Governor's
Counsel, supra].
Aiming to avoid "annihilating punishment of the defendant," the
New York Legislature amended the proposed statute to bar the
recovery of statutory damages in class actions. Vincent Alexander,
Practice Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B MCKINNEY'S
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK, ANN. 104 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In his signing statement, Governor Hugh
Carey stated that the new statute "empowers the court to prevent abuse
of the class action device and provides a controlled remedy."
Memorandum on Approving L. 1975, Ch. 207, reprinted in 1975 N.Y.
Laws at 1748 (emphasis added).
"[T]he final bill . . . was the result of a compromise among
competing interests." [citing Sperry]. 153
As noted above and discussed further below, this portrayal of the
emergence of § 901(b) is ironic in that in cases like Ratner v. Chemical
Bank, Federal Rule 23 proved to be a sufficiently controlled remedy in
that class certification of a penalty action was denied where the court
found it to be too potentially coercive in light of the lack of willful
statutory violation or actual harm to the named plaintiff. But a political
actor (or anyone else) reading the reference to Ratner made by groups
opposing the new law would be mislead to believe that Ratner and
Federal Rule 23 had indeed permitted a problematic, no-actual-damages
class action seeking $130 million.154  Further, the "constituents" of
which the dissent speaks were not rank-and-file voters (and certainly not
consumers) and prevailed without ever having their arguments tested in
legislative or public debate. The retail merchants, insurers, banks, and
others concerned about greater leverage (represented largely through
their official lobbyin organizations rather than expressions of the
members individually) obtained a concession in the final weeks of the
153. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (citations omitted except as indicated in text)
(emphasis in original).
154. See supra note 141 accompanying text
155. Depending on the legislation and its circumstances, this can be important. For example, a
lobbying organization's position may be considerably more left or right than the views of many of
its members. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce appears to have become steadily more
conservative on public policy issues during the past two decades, so much so that some prominent
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legislative session with essentially no public knowledge of or discussion
of their proposal. In particular, there is no basis upon review of the
law's Bill Jacket for concluding that when Governor Carey referred to a
"controlled" remedy (language the dissent sought so important it was
italicized), he was referring to § 901(b).
The dissent's discussion of legislative history also suggests that it is
overly credulous of the complaint that class actions are unduly coercive,
a form of legal blackmail posing company killing risk:
"Even in the mine-run case, a class action can result in "potentially
ruinous liability." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23, 28 U.S.C. App. P. 143. A court's decision to certify a class
accordingly places pressure on the defendant to settle even
unmeritorious claims. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 476, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978). When
representative plaintiffs seek statutory damages, pressure to settle may
be heightened because a class action poses the risk of massive liability
unmoored to actual injury. See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.DNY 1972) (exercising
"considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature" to refuse to certify a
class because the plaintiffs suffered negl ible actual damages but
sought statutory damages of $13,000,000).
companies have dropped membership or publically disagreed with Chamber positions. Susie
Shutts, Companies Abandon Chamber of Commerce Over Climate Change Stance, YES!
MAGAZINE, Oct. 8, 2009, available at http://www.yesmagazine.org/planet/companies-abandon-
chamber-of-commerce-over-climate-change-stance. (Apple, Pacific Gas & Electric, PNM, and
Exelon withdraw from organization; Nike withdraws from board by retains membership; General
Electric and Johnson & Johnson publicly criticize Chamber position on climate change).
156. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465. The dissent was aware that in Ratner, the trial court
denied certification due to in terrorem concerns. But, as noted above, there is nothing to indicate
that the state legislature or Governor Carey was aware of the correct Ratner holding as the case is
misleadingly invoked by interest groups lobbying against the state class action law. See supra note
174 and accompanying text.. It is worth re-quoting the Empire State Chamber of Commerce,
Memorandum in Opposition to A. 1252 and S. 1309 (to establish new rules for "class actions"), at 3
(underlining in original) (see supra note 141 and accompanying text), which was the primary
invocation of Ratner as part of the business opposition to the proposed law:
Penalties and class actions simply do not mix. This was proved in Ratner v. Chemical
Bank, a case under the Federal Rules where the combination caused a potential liability
of $130,000,000 although the actual damages to individual plaintiffs were zero!
This injustice could be remedies by adding subsection B to Section 901, to provide that
unless a statue creating or imposing a penalty or other minimum recovery specifically
authorized the recovery ther3of in a class action, an action to recover such a penalty or
minimum recovery created or imposed by such statute may not be maintained as a class
action.
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Although the "class action as unfair legal blackmail" notion is
widespread, a closer look at class actions in operation and their actual
impact on business tends to debunk this mythology.157  Consequently, it
is a little disheartening for the dissent to seem to so readily accept this
argument against the class action and the underlying erroneous argument
that even in the absence of class certification consumers have adequate
incentives to pursue claims vindicating their statutory rights.158
Undoubtedly, the dissenters' response would be that regardless of the
errors of the anti-class action arguments, they were persuasive to New
York lawmakers. But, as a fuller legislative history of § 901(b) shows,
the anti-penalty provision became part of the resulting law with almost
no scrutiny or analysis.159  This should give courts pause before
privileging this type of "law" over validly promulgated Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Justice Stevens in concurrence was less of a cheerleader for the §
901(b) legislation than were the Ginsburg dissenters but was still unduly
deferential to the law and unduly credulous of the drive-by legislative
history incorporated into the Practice Commentaries to McKinney's
Id. A reasonable reader could view the Chamber of Commerce memorandum as describing a case
in which uninjured plaintiffs were permitted to recover $130 million when the exact opposite
occurred in Ratner, notwithstanding the FED. R. Clv. P. 23 has no limitation on statutory penalty
class actions.
Ratner was in another instance cited as an example of "uneven" application of FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 due to the large discretion possessed by federal judges. See Report No. 405, State Bar of
New York re Proposed Class Action Legislation, at 2 (on file with author). Although the State Bar
clearly opposed the class action law and favored Ratner's restrictive view of Federal Rule 23, the
case is not used in this instance to make the "annihilating punishment" argument. The reader of this
report would gain little actual knowledge of the Ratner case itself or Federal Rule 23's treatment of
statutory penalty class actions.
The Shady Grove dissent to a degree recognized that § 901(b) is special interest legislation
that is not particularly logical in that "suits seeking statutory damages are arguably best suited to the
class device because individual proof of actual damages is unnecessary." Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct.
at 1465 (italics in original). But instead of considering whether this sort of illogical provision
favoring vested interests should trigger Erie's ejection of an otherwise applicable Federal Rule, the
dissent concluded that this flaw in § 901(b) emphasized the substantive nature of the provision.
"New York's decision instead to block class-action proceedings for statutory damages therefore
makes scant sense, except as a means to a manifestly substantive end." Id
157. See, e.g., Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision, supra note 99, at 1127, 1133-55
(arguing that criticisms of coercive force of class certification is overstated); Silver, supra note 101
(comprehensive debunking of the exaggerated blackmail critique of class actions); Hay &
Rosenberg, supra note 101 (characterizing class device more as an equalizer than as means by
which plaintiffs for counsel gain excessive leverage over business defendants).
158. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text, (statutory penalties, even with possible
attomey fee shifting to victorious consumers, are insufficient incentives for bringing individual suits
against defendants violating statute).
159. See supra text and accompanying note Section III.C.
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Annotated New York Statutes. Like the dissent, he accepted the
legislation as a considered judgment of New York but saw it as
sufficiently procedural that it was required to yield to Federal Rule
23. 160
As previously discussed, the actual legislative history of § 901(b) is
one of interest group advocacy and unduly easy acceptance in order to
defuse remaining opposition to the pending law, with no serious
examination of the merits of the question of whether statutory penalty
class actions are excessively confiscatory or business-killing. Further,
the Shady Grove dissent and concurrence as well as the New York Court
of Appeals and the McKinney's Practice Commentaries all appear to
share the same cardboard characterization of § 901(b)'s legislative
history. When the entire Bill Jacket and surrounding materials are
reviewed, it is clear that cases like Ratner v. Chemical Bank were an
important illustration of the potential evils of penalty class actions. But
nowhere in the legislative history do any official actors embrace the
"annihilating punishment" rhetoric of Ratner. But somehow, through
the magic of translation and the social construction of history, the almost
afterthought-like attachment of § 901(b) to the new class action law has
become enshrined as a palpable fear of class actions destroying
businesses widely held by the New York citizenry. The actual
legislative history is hardly as phobic about class actions as the sketch of
it contained in the McKinney's Practice Commentaries, the Sperry v.
Crompton Corp. Court of Appeals decision, and the Shady Grove
dissent.
160. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448, 1458 ("The legislative history, moreover, does not
clearly describe a judgment that § 901(b) would operate as a limitation on New York's statutory
damages. In evaluating that legislative history, it is necessary to distinguish between procedural
rules adopted for some policy reason and seemingly procedural rules that are intimately bound up in
the scope of a substantive right or remedy. Although almost every rule is adopted for some reason
and has some effect on the outcome of litigation, not every state rule "defines the dimensions of [a]
claim itself." New York clearly crafted § 90 1(b) with the intent that only certain lawsuits-those
for which there were not statutory penalties-could be joined in class actions in New York courts.
That decision reflects a policy judgment about which lawsuits should proceed in New York courts
in a class form and which should not. As Justice Ginsburg carefully outlines, § 901(b) was
'apparently' adopted in response to fears that the class-action procedure applied to statutory
penalties would lead to 'annihilating punishment of the defendant.' Vincent Alexander, Practice
Commentaries, C90 1:11, reprinted in 7B MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANN.
104 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Sperry v. Crompton Cor., 863 N.E.2d
1012, 1015. But statements such as these are not particularly strong evidence that § 901(b) serves to
define who can obtain a statutory penalty or that certifying such a class would enlarge New York's
remedy. Any device that makes litigation easier makes it easier for plaintiffs to recover damages.").
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One might ask how it came to pass that the Shady Grove dissent
(and to a lesser extent the Shady Grove concurrence) came to provide
such a straw man picture of the class action law. One suspects that
rather than focusing on the Bill Jacket itself or the larger contemporary
context of the legislation, which would have lead the courts to appreciate
the astounding lack of substantive discussion and public input
surrounding § 901(b), both the New York Court of Appeals in Sperry v.
Crompton and the Shady Grove dissent and concurrence took a shortcut
that oversimplified and idealized the statutory penalty ban on class
actions.
In Sperry v. Crompton, the Court of Appeals relied excessively on a
McKinney's Practice Commentary that was at best oversimplified and
arguably misleading.161 The Shady Grove dissent in turn relied
excessively on Sperry and the Court of Appeals oversimplification rather
than looking closely at the full legislative history and the political
realities of § 901(b)'s non-examination by both political elites and the
public. The vision of legislative history set forth in Sperry and the
Shady Grove dissent is incomplete and misleading in elevating an
expedient last minute concession to self-serving private interest I2oups
to the status of momentous expression of state substantive law. By
contrast, the Shady Grove plurality's preference for avoiding this
political thicket looks positively enlightened as well as more
expeditious, simpler, and subject to more consistent application.
Unlike Rule 23, designed to further procedural fairness and efficiency,
§ 901(b) (we are told [by the dissenters]),"responds to an entirely
different concern": the fear that allowing statutory damages to be
awarded on a class-wide basis would "produce overkill." The dissent
reaches this conclusion on the basis of (1) constituent concern recorded
161. See supra note 148 (describing limitations of Practice Commentary as authoritative
legislative history).
162. Sperry also illustrates the degree to which § 901(b) is based on the faulty premise that the
existence of statutory penalties eliminates the rationale for class actions. Sperry involved an
antitrust claim under New York General Business Law § 340, which provides for treble damages in
the event of a violation. See Sperry, 863 N.E.2d at 1012-15. Although trebling may be a powerful
remedy and significant penalty where the antitrust injury is large, it hardly does much to make
individual litigation of small claims feasible. For example, a consumer may pay a few cents more
for a household product due to the anti-competitive conduct by the manufacturer or retailer. Even if
the consumer is regularly buying the product in Costco or Sam's Club sized portions for many
years, the amount of injury to the individual consumer will never prompt a rational litigant (save
perhaps the independently wealthy, unemployed crusader or perhaps an advocacy group) to incur
the time, effort, and aggravation of litigation, even if recovery of out-of-pocket counsel fees is
possible. Without class treatment, this type of antitrust violation is essentially immunized in New
York courts.
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in the law's bill jacket; (2) a commentary suggesting that the
Legislature "apparently fear[ed]" that combining class actions and
statutory penalties "could result in annihilating punishment of the
defendant,"; (3) a remark by the Governor in his signing statement that
§ 901(b) "provides a controlled remedy,", and (4) a state court's
statement that the final text of § 901(b) "was the result of a
compromise among competing interests."'
This evidence of the New York Legislature's purpose is pretty
sparse. But even accepting the dissent's account of the Legislature's
objective at face value, it cannot override the statute's clear text. Even
if its aim is to restrict the remedy a plaintiff can obtain, § 901(b)
achieves that end by limiting a plaintiffs power to maintain a class
action [which directly conflicts with Federal Rule 23]. 163
As the foregoing, more comprehensive, review of the legislative
history, politics, and journalistic coverage of the law shows (but still one
"pretty sparse" owing to the lack of sustained examination of § 901(b)),
the story of the inclusion of the penalty limitation is something other
than a pure civics textbook example of the rational, public-regarding
legislature in action. The bill as a whole reflected sound public policy
and widely shared sentiment accumulated over years of analysis and
experience. But the engrafting of the statutory penalty limitation came
on with all the fanfare of an earmark to an appropriations bill. Although
not descending entirely to the level of the lobbyist's side deal in a side
corridor, neither does the story of § 901(b) inspire much confidence that
the penalty limitation reflects the considered judgment of the New York
electorate or their chosen representatives regarding this constriction of
the class action device.
D. The Case Misleadingly Used to Illustrate Allegedly Abusive Class
Action
A look at Ratner v. Chemical Bank,164 which served as something
of a poster child example of an oppressive class actionl65 serves as an
163. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440 (citations omitted) ("The manner in which the law
'could have been written,' has no bearing; what matters is the law the Legislature did enact. We
cannot rewrite that to reflect our perception of legislative purpose. The dissent's concern for state
prerogatives is frustrated rather than furthered by revising state laws when a potential conflict with a
Federal Rule arises; the state-friendly approach would be to accept the law as written and test the
validity of the Federal Rule." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
164. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
165. In addition to being referenced in the Practice Commentaries to § 901(b), Ratner was
frequently cited by opponents of class actions as an example of a situation in which aggregation of
trivial claims could create excessive liability for inadvertent violations of the law. Lost in most of
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instructive beginning to debunking some of the mythology surrounding
§ 901(b) and appreciating the absence of any real reflection regarding
this carve-back of the original class action bill supported by New York's
judiciary and consumer groups. Plaintiff, "holder of a Master Charge
credit card . . . sued to redress an asserted violation of the Act by
defendant-namely the failure to show a 'nominal annual percentage
rate' on a periodic statement reporting an outstanding principal balance
but no interest charge yet accrued" and "undertook to sue for himself
and as representative of other debtors similarly situated."l 66 The Truth
in Lending Act ("TLA") provides for minimum liability of $100 plus
costs and reasonable counsel fees for each violation, regardless of
whether plaintiff has suffered actual damages.167 Plaintiff Ratner sought
certification for a class estimated to include as many as 130,000 card
holders. "At a minimum rate of $100 apiece, this class would be entitled
to a sum in the neighborhood of $130,000,000."168
But the federal trial judge, former Columbia Law School Dean
Marvin Frankel, would have none of what he perceived to be a
pretextual claim.169 He questioned plaintiffs theory of the case almost
to the point of making a summary judgment decision adverse to plaintiff
Plaintiffs theory, it may be recalled, is that the "nominal annual
percentage rate" should have been shown so that plaintiff (and others
like him) could compare competing interest rates and make an
informed choice. Assuming the rate (18%) had been shown, and
assuming plaintiff had elected to borrow elsewhere, and assuming he
could have borrowed at 6%, the difference in annual percentage rate
would have been 12%, or, for the one month affected by the omission,
1%. The principal amount affected by the rate was a new indebtedness
of $191.58. . .. The difference in interest, even on these excessively
favorable assumptions, would have been less than $2. More
realistically, of course, consumer credit of the kind in question comes170generally at a rate very like 18% per annum.
the discussion is that in Ratner itself, this theoretically unfair and business-destroying class action
was not permitted even under Federal Rule 23, which had no prohibition on penalty class actions.
166. Id. at 412.
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 16540(e).
168. Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 414.
169. 1 borrow the term from Professor Sebok, who has deemed certain classes of purported
technical legal violations that cause little or no harm but create the prospect of generating counsel
fees, extorting settlements, or gaining business or publicity leverage as "pretextual torts" in that the
plaintiffs are not seeking significant corrective justice. See Anthony Sebok, Remarks, Symposium,
Asbestos Litigation, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 281 (2006) (panel discussion).
170. Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 413, n.2 (citation omitted).
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Clearly, Judge Frankel saw plaintiff and counsel crying crocodile
tears in order to gain leverage over the bank for purposes of extorting a
settlement in a case without genuine victims, noting that "[n]o other
member of the proposed class has evinced an interest in the lawsuit or
brought a similar suit elsewhere, and the one-year limitation period" for
TWA suits "has long since expired."' 7 ' But it was the sheer magnitude
of the case and the bank's potential exposure rather than the merits of
the claim that appeared to offend the court and led to a denial of class
certification.
[A]llowance of thousands of minimum recoveries like plaintiffs
would carry to an absurd and stultifying extreme the specific and
essentially inconsistent remedy Congress prescribed as the means of
private enforcement.172
Students of [Federal Rule 23] have been lead generally to recognize
that its broad and open-ended terms call for the exercise of some
considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature. Appealing to that kind
of judgment, defendant points out that (1) the incentive of class-action
benefits is unnecessary in view of the Act's provisions for a $100
minimum recovery and payment of costs and a reasonable fee for
counsel; and (2) the proposed recovery of $100 each for some 130,000
class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any
benefit to defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable
violation of the Truth in Lending Act. These points are cogent and
persuasive. They are summarized compendiously in the overall
conclusion stated earlier: the allowance of this as a class action is
essentially inconsistent with the specific remedy supplied by Congress
and employed by plaintiff in this case. It is not fairly possible in the
circumstances of this case to find the [Federal Rule23](b)(3) form of
[damages] class action "superior to" this specifically "available
[method] for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."1 73
The Ratner court's rationale became the playbook for elements of
the New York bar and business interest groups attempting to prohibit
penalty class actions as a means of weakening proposed legislation that
they disfavored overall. 174 To a degree, this is understandable in that the
Ratner arguments are not bad, particularly on the facts of that case, and
171. Id. at 414. See also id. at 415 (attacking other aspects of substance of plaintiff's theory of
the case and claimed injury).
172. Id. at 414.
173. Id. at 416.
174. See supra note 164-71 and accompanying text.
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the opinion was authored by one of the country's most prestigious
jurists. But the Ratner rationale is hardly unassailable and was in any
event not seriously examined during the legislative process that led to
the almost sub silentio pruning of the new progressive state class action
law by cutting out statutory penalty class actions.
One can take serious issue with the Ratner Court's rationale that
annual percentage rate disclosure would have done little good to the
plaintiff (and proposed class) because it was only one month of
information omission, which amounts to little accrued interest for the
time and principal at issue. To be sure, when the matter is sliced so
thinly, the damages appear trivial. But if the full disclosure demanded
by TLA was not present at the outset of a patron's decision to acquire or
use a credit card, it could have considerable consequence. The
cardholder might use the card for major purchases that would otherwise
have been forgone or alternatively financed. Perhaps even disclosure a
month later will do little to help the cardholder already committed to a
high interest path that might have otherwise been avoided. To be sure, a
month's negligent omission of disclosure hardly seems like a capital
offense. But given the avowed deterrent purpose of TLA, Ratner is a
bit too glib in rejecting the notion of real injury to the plaintiff(s).
In addition, it simply appears not to be correct to suggest that a
$130 million judgment would comprise an "annihilating punishment" of
Chemical Bank. In 1972, Chemical Bank was the fourth largest bank in
the United States, with assets of $15 billion.176 The award sought by
Ratner would surely sting and appears grossly disproportionate to any
harm done, but it likely would not have led to the Bank's demise.
Although class certification would have given Mr. Ratner and his
counsel considerable leverage over the bank, the bank had not only the
option of attempting to settle the claim relatively cheaply (arguably
reducing any blackmail from the certification to a mere graymail cost of
doing business that would likely be passed on to customers and the
175. In addition to his stature as Columbia Law Dean, Judge Frankel was a noted jurist
prominent in public debates over judicial administration and the legal function, perhaps most
prominently during his ongoing debate with Hofstra Law Dean Monroe Freedman over the lawyer's
role when confronting issues of client perjury. Compare MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) (taking strong view of lawyer as partisan advocate with
view constraints), with MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980) (criticizing Freedman's
view and emphasizing lawyer's duties to as officer of the court). After leaving the bench, Judge
Frankel enjoyed a distinguished (although occasionally controversial) career as a name partner in a
prominent New York law firm.
176. FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Chemical-
Banking-Corporation-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
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public)177 but also the prospect of convincing the court that such an
award was unwarranted and unconscionable and rendered an absurd
result at odds with TILA's legislative intent and statutory purpose.178
Although such a finding might have been controversial and on the edge
of judicial activism, it is arguably no more of a reach than what the court
actually did - refusing even to certify a class in which the Federal Rule
23(a)_rerequisites for class certification appeared certainly to have been
met. If the matter was to be adjudicated at all a Federal Rule 23(b(3)
class action would have been "superior" to 130,000 individual suits.1 0
177. I realize such a passing on of litigation expenses has costs of its own. But if the net effect
of such settlements is to make the lenders more careful about observing statutory commands
regarding disclosure to costumers, net social welfare may be increased by more than the additional
costs imposed on customers to pay for the settlement.
178. TILA, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693, was
designed to require that lenders make adequate disclosures regarding interest rates and other terms
and conditions of their loans in order to "facilitate comparison shopping for credit." In particular,
disclosure of finance charges and the effective annual percentages charged for the use of money are
to be disclosed. See Robert A. Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The
TILA Class Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 811, n.19 (2003).
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) provides that a class may be maintained if the following minimum
prerequisites are satisfied:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defense of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id In addition, a claim must also qualify for class action treatment pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P.
23(b). See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at 788-95; JAMES, JR. ET AL, supra note 2, § 10.23;
WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 72. The FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) requirements were clearly satisfied in
Ratner as the putative class was huge, the TILA claims of the group were essentially the same, and
Plaintiff Ratner had competent legal counsel that could adequately represent the class if it were
certified.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides for three possible types of class action: one seeking to
avoid inconsistent adjudications or where an initial adjudication would prejudice the rights of other
class members (a FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) class action); one seeking to order particular defendant
conduct via an injunction or other apt relief (a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) class action); or one seeking
damages on behalf of the class (a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) class action). In order to qualify as a
damages class action, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires that the court find that "questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy." In making this determination, the trial court may consider:
(A) The class members interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions;
(B) The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by
or against class members;
(C) The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and
(D) The likely difficulties in managing a class action.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3); TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at 788-95; JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra
note 2, § 10.23; WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 72.
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In addition, Ratner can be criticized for its implicit view that large
class actions seeking large total awards are by their very nature
disfavored. Such an attitude tends to undermine the very rationale of the
class action. The 1966 Amendments to Federal Rule 23 were not
designed to accord class action treatment to only modest or medium
sized aggregations of claims involving common issues of law and fact.
There is no size limitation in Federal Rule 23.181 Judicial imposition of
an implicit size limitation is judicial activism that functions to reduce the
articulated scope of a legislative enactment.182 In this regard, a judge
arguably even more prominent and respected than Ratner trial judge
Frankel has characterized this aspect of the opnion as "one of those rare
instances where a judicial Homer nodded."
E. The Flawed Rationale At the Core of CPLR § 901(b) as a
Cautionary Tale Regarding Excessive Deference to State
Lawmaking
In the main, however, one can take greatest issue with the Ratner
Court's view that TLA already provides copious remedy for the
As noted above, Judge Frankel concluded that a class action was not a superior means of
adjudicating such a gigantic dispute with the aroma of a pretextual tort and that concentration of so
many claims in one case was undesirably. But because the class members had not interest in
individual adjudication and the failure to certify a class effectively precluded enforcement of a
federal statute, other reasonable jurists might disagree, notwithstanding the practical impact of class
certification in terms of giving Ratner significant settlement leverage over the Bank.
181. See FED. R. Civ. P.23 & advisory committee note to 1966 Amendment to Rule 23.
182. Although the Federal Rules are not enacted through the normal legislative process, they
carry the force of statute. After a Federal Civil Rule is promulgated through the normal rulemaking
process, which includes congressional "approval" through failing to intervene after Supreme Court
promulgation of the Rule, "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect." See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). See JAMES, JR. ET. AL., supra note 2,
§ 2.36; WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 54-55; Burbank, supra note 59.
183. See Parker v. Time Warner Ent't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 23, 27, n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., concurring) (characterizing Judge Frankel's undue resistance to large class actions in Ratner was
an uncharacteristic mistake and that "[a]lthough Ratner has been cited favorably by many courts, I
believe this is one of those rare instances where a judicial Homer nodded" (citations omitted)).
Judge Jon Newman has been a highly regarded federal district and Second Circuit judge for nearly
forty years and was prominently mentioned as being on President Clinton's "short list" of possible
nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOzO L. REV.
331, 395 (2003) (referring to Newman as well-respected judge); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the
Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 33, 94 (2003) (same).
The allusion to Homer nodding comes from AUGUSTUS S. WILKINS, THE ARS POETICA OF
HORACE 402 (1964) ("Homer himself bath been observ'd to nod.") (quoted in BARTLETT'S
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (13th ed. 1951) and refers the inevitability of human error, inattention, or
insufficient reflection even among highly talented humans). See Parker, 331 F.3d at 27.
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wronged financial consumer. In addition to the $100 statutory penalty,
the Court notes that counsel fees are available to the prevailing plaintiff
and that they would be approximately $20,000. But even this sort of
recovery (possible only because the matter became a test case for high-
powered lawyers)184 hardly makes the plaintiff whole. Plaintiff remains
uncompensated for the time, effort, and inconvenience of being a major
case litigant. A victory on the TWA claim in Ratner will never
compensate Plaintiff Ratner for these losses. The award of counsel fees
merely prevents Ratner's claim from being a huge drain on his personal
finances.1 85
This is hardly the sort of incentive that prompts otherwise sane
citizens to tilt at judicial windmills by picking a fight with one of the
nation's largest financial institutions and its high-powered counsel.
Even if one accepts that the "real" plaintiff in the case is plaintiff's law
firm, the incentive structure and potential rewards are hardly as
munificent as the Ratner court suggests. Twenty thousand dollars is a
nice chunk of change, but it is hardly free money. It represents the law
firm's opportunity costs in bringing the case and is to some degree
contingent.
In addition, there is always a contingency that may be adverse to
plaintiffs like Ratner. Even what appears to be a strong TWA case may
not be a sure winner. Even a sure winner may run up against a judge
who dislikes the Act and rules adversely, requiring at minimum a trip to
the Court of Appeals for compensation. At the end of even a successful
litigation "day," the lawyers may find that they could have earned far
more than $20,000 had they invested similar time, effort and skill in
pursuing other class actions, basic tort claims such as automobile
accidents or slip-and-fall incidents, or even through the grind of
insurance defense tort work. Without TILA's minimum statutory
damages and fee-shifting, no sane person would litigate a minor TLA
184. The Ratner plaintiffs were aided by Professors Jack Greenberg, Eric Schapper, and Philip
Schrag. Chemical Bank was represented by Cravath, Swaine & Moore, a top national law firm. See
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (listing counsel).
185. Settlement of class actions must be approved by the court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). At
the time Ratner was decided, it was permissible in settling a class action for the named class
representatives to receive a settlement amount greater than that of other class members and larger
than the actual losses incurred by the named representatives in order to compensate the
representative for the burdens of carrying the litigation forward on behalf of the class. Subsequent
legislation forbids such enhanced settlement payments to class members in securities class action.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (codifying Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)). See also TEPLY & WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 788-95, supra note
2; JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. & LEUBSDORF, supra note 2, § 10.23; WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 72.
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violation. But even with these plaintiff-strengthening tools, there are
many factors counseling the sane against litigation, at least when it must
be pursued on an individual, case-by-case basis.
Put another way, the mere presence of a statutory penalty, even one
high in relation to actual injury, often does not create much incentive for
pursuing individual litigation. One need only ask the rhetorical
question: Would a consumer like Ratner aggrieved by a technical TWA
violation who had lost little in actual damages seek out counsel and
prosecute an individual claim just to have a shot at $100 in statutory
damages and reimbursement of counsel fees? Would such a cranky do-
gooder consumer even be able to find a competent lawyer willing to take
the case?
In my view, the answer to both questions is a resounding "no."
Only the possibility of class action treatment spurred Ratner and counsel
to action. Without class certification, the case died (there was never any
appellate consideration of the trial court's refusal to accord class
treatment), as have other TLA claims denied class certification.
Undoubtedly, there are untold numbers of TLA claims that were never
brought because of these practical financial and logistical barriers. The
Ratner Court's own opinion suggests this by noting that other than
Plaintiff Ratner no other putative class members had come forward to
litigate with the bank over these issues despite the supposedly enticing
allure of the possibility of $100 statutory damages and repayment of
counsel fees.
In this sense, the Ratner rationale-and that of those who lobbied
for § 901(b) in the New York law-is seriously flawed and, at least in
my view, outright wrong. In many, perhaps even most cases where
statutory penalties are established, they are nonetheless usually
insufficient to make individual pursuit of modest claims realistic. Even
a statute with a strong penalty provision such as Insurance Law § 5106,
the statute at issue in the underlying dispute in Shady Grove, a
substantive law that provides for two percent (2%) interest per month
regarding unpaid medical services to no-fault insurance claimants, does
not do enough to make individual litigation very attractive.
As all Justices observed in Shady Grove, the statutory penalty as
applied to the past due medical bill for insured Sonia Galvez was only
approximately $500. Justice Ginsburg's dissent is heated in its
condemnation of the unwisdom of allowing this $500 claim to become a
$5 million claim. My question is why Justice Ginsburg is not similarly
concerned that even with the statutory penalties provided by New York
Insurance Law § 5106, there exists a situation where insurance
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companies, which by definition make money by "playing the float" and
holding funds as long as possible before paying even valid claims.186
186. See Warren E. Buffett, Letter to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 2, 7-10 (Feb.
21, 2003) (sections in letter on "The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance" and "Insurance
Operations") (on file with author) (recapping 2002 year; emphasizing importance of "float"-
premium dollars and investment funds held by the insurer prior to being needed to pay claims-to
profitability of insurance companies. Berkshire Hathaway, Buffet's celebrated entity, is a holding
company consisting of, among other things, several large insurers or reinsurers. Regarding the
company and insurance, Buffett observed:
Our core business-though we have others of great importance-is insurance. To
understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an
insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business
generates; (2) its cost; and (e) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these
factors.
To being with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation,
float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that
sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money.
This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer
takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves
it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has
value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise
incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than
market rates for money.
If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they must:
underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively; and (c) avoid an
aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly "impossible" incident to
threaten their solvency.
See id. at 7, 8. See generally MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE ch. 1 (8th ed. 2005) (discussing risk and insurance generally).
What Buffett fails to mention (perhaps because he enjoys an apparently well-deserved
reputation as an ethical capitalist) is that an insurer can attempt to improve its cost of float and
income by delaying the payment of claims-by paying later than due the losses that must "it
eventually must pay." This can take the form of a merely lackadaisical attitude toward paying
claims. Everyone at an insurance company, from top to bottom knows that if claims are paid slower
rather than faster, the insurer makes at least a modest amount of additional interest, knowledge that
can sap an insurer's will to pay claims with alacrity. Among unscrupulous insurers, there can
develop a culture or even a business model of purposefully delaying claims, perhaps by making
pretextual requests for additional information, pretending to mislay files, quibbling about a
policyholder's documentation and verification of a claim, or simply waiting to pay the claim for
several weeks simply to enjoy greater investment income. New York Insurance Law § 5106 and its
implementing regulations, like most state unfair claims practices laws, attempts to counter this
insurer incentive by subjecting unpaid claims to a high interest rate or fine.
Although the Shady Grove allegations against Allstate alleging conscious policy of
deliberately pretending not to receive claims and documentation and then purposefully delaying
payment even after all the paperwork has concededly been received (see supra note 42-44 and
accompanying text, summarizing allegations) may sound excessively paranoid, substantial evidence
exists to suggest that notwithstanding laws like § 5106, insurers engage in such misbehavior,
something I have labeled "institutionalized bad faith" because it occurs as a consequence of
deliberate company policy rather than mistakes by agents in the field. See David Evans, Insurers
Hold Billions in Federal Death Benefits in Unprotected Accounts, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 1,
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2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073100035.html (describing as "institutionalized bad faith"
life insurer practice of inducing beneficiaries to leave death benefit funds in a "retained asset
account" with the insurer rather than demanding immediate payment, a ploy that permits insurer to
continue to benefit from float on premium and investment dollars). See also David Evans, Fallen
Soldiers Families Denied Cash as Insurers Profit, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 28, 2010, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/fallen-soldiers-families-denied-cash-payout-as-life-
insurers-boost-profit.html (using "institutionalized bad faith" term to describe automobile insurer
practice of uniformly making non-negotiable "lowball" settlement offers regardless of individual
facts, in so-called "Minor Injury, Soft Tissue" injury cases); David Zax, When The Brain Breaks,
YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, Nov./Dec. 2010 at 20 (describing Ph.D. economist suffering soft tissue
injury to brain from low-impact, low-speed, rear-end collision, causing serious injury that
dramatically damaged much of her cognitive ability: after the accident, "I couldn't add up my time
sheet."). Describing the accident, one that should surely be disparaged by defense counsel arguing
before a jury, victim Anne Forrest stated that she "was hit from behind. I was looking left in order
to merge into traffic, and my head swung from side to side and backwards and forwards. It was a
slow-speed accident, a seemingly insignificant accident. There was some damage to my bumper."
Id.
Regarding insurers succumbing to the temptation to purposely delay payment to profit
from investment float, I have seen an affidavit from a former AIG employee alleging that company
policy was for local representatives to hold checks from the home office for days or even weeks
before delivering them to claims. (I, of course, am not in a position to assess the truth of the
affidavit, but even if the product of a disgruntled former employee, it surely suggests the potential
for problems in this regard.) In addition, evidence presented at trial has suggested that major
insurers have substantial incentives to quibble about the amount of payment due on injury claims.
See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM chs. 16,
17 (2008) (discussing evidence of bad faith presented at trial against major insurer).
In short, N.Y. Ins. Law § 5106 addresses a major problem that is hard to police, even with
statutory penalties. Arguably, this reflects the substantive policy of New York at least as much as
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b). Interestingly, one of the implementing regulations to § 5106 appears to
envision that aggrieved policyholders would indeed be bringing class actions against insurers.
If any applicant [for payment of a claim] is a member of a class in a class action brought
for payment of benefits, but is not a named party, interest shall not accumulate on the
disputed claim or element of a claim until a class which includes such applicant is
certified by court order, or such benefits are authorized in that action by Appellate Court
decision, whichever is earlier.
See 11 N.Y. C.R.R. § 65-3.9(c).
This regulation was originally promulgated in 1973 but extensive changes were made
when New York's no-fault statute, N.Y. Ins. Law. Article 51, was substantially revised in 1977.
Additional revisions took place in 1999, but were required to be re-promulgated in 2001 due to
procedural discrepancies resulting in the invalidation of the 1999 promulgation. See Medical Soc'y
of the State of N.Y. v. Levin, 712 N.Y. S.2d 745 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 2000) (invalidating
regulations on grounds of non-compliance with state Administrative Procedure Act); Medical
Soc'y of the State of N.Y. v. Serio, 749 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 2002) (noting re-
promulgation of regulations to correct earlier infirmity).
If one is to make the functional assessment of state law urged by the Shady Grove dissent,
it certainly would appear colorable to conclude that this regulation effectively authorizes a penalty
class action regarding interest on past due payments, or at least reflects New York public policy
favoring such actions-a policy post-dating the 1975 enactment of § 901(b). Although the face of §
5106 may not so provide, insurance is historically heavily regulated and legislators enact insurance
statutes with an expectation that their meaning and enforcement will be developed through
administrative regulation. Although one of the virtues of the Scalia plurality is that courts are
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Insurers have little incentive to behave well because victimized
medical vendors have little incentive to sue slow-paying insurers in the
absence of the availability of a class action. Contrary to the
arguments raised by those lobbying for the prohibition on statutory class
actions, it appears simply untrue that the presence of a statutory penalty,
even one providing for recovery of counsel fees, guarantees that there
exists sufficient incentive to bring meritorious suits for small injuries. If
this argument of the lobbyists is wrong, the premise underlying §
901(b)-that it is overkill-is also incorrect.
Of course, my analysis could be "wrong" in the sense that after
sustained examination it would be rejected by reasonable legislators in
favor of the Ratner view. It would not be the first time that reasonable
observers preferred the insights of a Marvin Frankel or Ruth Bader
Ginsburg to my differing analyses. But regardless of who is correct, the
inarguable point is that § 901(b) arrived on the scene and became part of
state law with almost no serious reflection. It was added, however, to
thoughtful class action law years in the making that was modeled on a
successful and tested federal procedural rule. Neither the legislature nor
the executive appears to have seriously examined or debated the
arguments in favor of the penalty limitation. The general public was
never even informed of the matter or given a chance to assess the
arguments for, or against, a penalty limitation. This aspect of the
legislation appears to have been solely the province of political insiders
engaged in some last-minute tinkering designed to secure smooth
enactment.
Under these circumstances, courts would do well to hesitate before
embracing the view that § 901(b) represents some considered
spared this difficult inquiry, one can certainly argue that courts applying New York law have erred
in too quickly concluding that § 901(b) barred class action enforcement of the applicable insurance
law. Certainly, as discussed herein (text and accompanying notes supra), the mere existence of the
two percent per month interest charges was not in many cases enough incentive to prompt victims
of slow insurance company payment to vindicate their rights in court.
187. Although a medical provider such as Shady Grove may achieve some economy of scale in
routinizing a system of suing medical insurers for delayed payment violating N.Y. Ins. Law § 5106,
many of its patients no doubt generate relatively modest bills that, standing alone, are not
sufficiently large to justify the time, expense, aggravation, and opportunity cost of litigation.
Depending upon state law and the nature of any agreements with insurers, a medical provider or
other vendor in this position may be able to style its claims as bringing an action for anticipatory
breach of contract. But in addition to the obvious problem of § 5106 being a statutory duty rather
than a contractual one, a significant body of state law treats insurance claims as inapt for
acceleration and consolidation on a theory of anticipatory breach. See Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract
Characterization, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 85, 150-55 (2010).
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determination of the State of New York and its citizens. While
legislation has been likened, to paraphrase Bismarck, to sausage-making
where too close a view of the process can be distasteful,' the resulting
legislative product is positive law entitled to legal force, at least within
its sphere of operation. But this hardly requires that an on-point Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure yield to a "law fragment" that was never well
vetted by political elites nor vetted at all by the electorate. The Shady
Grove dissent's attempt to privilege suspicious § 901(b) over Federal
Rule 23 is all the more ironic when one considers that the primary thrust
of the 1975 New York legislation was to bring state class action practice
into harmony with federal practice. Certainly, this is what any
reasonable member of the electorate reading news accounts of the
legislation would believe (and presumably support). Limitations on
penalty class actions were simply not under public scrutiny.
Indeed, because § 901(b) was not under much scrutiny from New
York's elite policy makers, it is not clear whether support for the penalty
limitation was viewed as merely an express means of harmonizing the
new state law with Federal Rule 23 or was instead a considered attempt
to make New York class action law narrower than the federal
counterpart on which it was modeled. This is the other great irony of
having Ratner v. Chemical Bank serve as a rallying point for § 901(b).
In Ratner, the court denied class action treatment of a TLA penalty
action based on the language of Federal Rule 23. The Ratner Court did
not need the express language of § 901(b) in order to avoid the perceived
harm of the potentially "annihilating" class action feared by the bill's
opponents. Federal Rule 23 was sufficient. Although federal courts
differ over the issue, Ratner suggests that § 901(b) was unnecessary or
188. Otto von Bismarck, the master politician and founder of modem Germany in the late
Nineteenth Century, allegedly opined that "[i]f you like law and sausages, you should never watch
either one being made." See Robert Pear, If Only Laws Were Like Sausages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2010, at 3, col. I ("Week in Review" section). However, one reporter familiar with the legislative
process found that "a visit to a sausage factory [near Washington, D.C.] suggests that Bismarck and
today's politicians [who often quote Bismarck] are mistaken. In many ways, that quotation is
offensive to sausage makers; their process is better controlled and more predictable." Id
"In a real sausage plant," [Rutgers public policy] Professor [Alan] Rosenthal said,
"everybody is on the same team, trying to produce bratwurst or knockwurst. In the
legislative sausage factory, at least half the people don't want to make sausage. Or they
want to make a different kind. . . .
Big bills often include special-interest provisions whose origin is a mystery. By
contrast, [a sausage master] knows exactly where his ingredients come from.
Id. at 3, cols. 3-4. As previously discussed (text and accompanying supra note 156, § 901(b) has
many traits of special-interest legislation even if Bismarck and others may be misinformed in
likening it to sausage-making.
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that some support for the state limitation may have stemmed from a
mistaken view that federal courts always frowned upon class actions in
statutory penalty cases.
Most likely, however, the legislative history of § 901(b) suggests
simply that the legislature did not give the matter much thought and
simply rushed to judgment on the basis of glib pronouncements about
the efficacy of penalties to spur individual actions for redress and the
inordinate dangers of aggregating statutory penalty claims. In any event,
the Shady Grove dissent's lionization of § 901(b) as a statement of
public-regarding compromise and widespread consensus seems
demonstrably incorrect when the legislative background of the law
receives closer examination.
IV THE UNEXPECTED VIRTUES OF FORMALISM IN SHADY GROVE AND
BEYOND
Although some legislative decisions are, like some sports victories,
"ugly" rather than artistic, all state laws require judicial deference absent
unconstitutionality or fatal defects in their formation (defects sufficiently
large that the provisions do not qualify as duly enacted "laws"). Under
the Erie doctrine, in the absence of applicable federal law, such state
laws provide controlling rules of decision on substantive points no
matter how much wiser elements of the legal profession might disagree
with that substance.
Erie itself provides a good illustration of both the concept and its
privileging of state prerogatives and federal-state consistency over
aspirations to more frequently apply "better" rules of law. Recall than in
Erie, the applicable state law (Pennsylvania) in a case brought by a
plaintiff injured due to alleged railroad negligence in maintaining its
vehicles, tracks, or footpaths treated the plaintiff using the footpath as a
mere "trespasser" to whom the railroad owed little obligation,
notwithstanding that the path was widely used by area pedestrians.189 In
contrast, the federal common law rule applicable under Swift v. Tyson,
treated such plaintiffs as invitees to whom a duty of reasonable care was
owed. If, as Plaintiff Tompkins alleged, he was hit by an unsecured train
189. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938) ("[U]nder the law of Pennsylvania,
as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way-that is a
longitudinal pathway as distinguished from a crossing--are to be deemed trespassers; and that the
railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it
be wanton or wilful [sic].").
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door, grappling hook or the like,190 most would agree that the federal
common law at the time made more sense as a matter of substantive tort
law and public policyl91 but under Erie this less hospitable judicial
treatment of such victims was required because federal deference to the
state law was required. Tompkins had to "die" in order that federalism
might "live," at least live better than had been the case under Swift v.
Tyson.19 2
Although, as Erie itself shows, 180-degree judicial turns can occur
even after a century of seemingly settled law, but that is hardly the norm.
Although Erie-both the decision and the doctrine--can be criticized,193
it appears to be overwhelmingly accepted as an improvement on Sw i.
and is, as a practical matter, probably here to stay in American law.
190. See id. at 69 ("[Tompkins] claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the
operation, or maintenance, of the train; that he was rightfully on the premises as licensee because on
a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks; and that he
was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars.").
191. See id. at 70 (quoting Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1937) (under
federal common law, "it is well settled that the question of the responsibility of railroad for injuries
caused by its servants is one of general law [and the rule is that where] the public has made open
and notorious use of a railroad right of way for a long period of time and without objection, the
company owes a duty of care in the operation of its trains. . . . It is likewise generally recognized
law that a jury may find that negligence exists toward a pedestrian using a permissive path on the
railroad right of way if he is hit by some object projecting from the side of the train.")).
192. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
193. For example, the Erie Court could have, in my view, announced the overruling of Swift v.
Tyson and nonetheless given Tompkins the benefit of the more enlightened federal tort rule on the
ground that there was sufficient federal interest in uniformity due to the massively interstate
presence of railroad right of ways, their danger, and the need for uniformity regarding permissive
users of railroad pathways across the country that was comparable in importance to the goal of
uniformity of outcomes in federal and state courts. Although there is no "general federal common
law" after Erie, there continues to exist federal common law in areas of sufficient federal interest
and importance. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (federal common law
applies to interstate pollution dispute). But see WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 60 (stating that the Illinois
v. Milwaukee case "seemed to some to go very far" in using expansive concept of proper use of
federal common law). Almost certainly, Professor Wright and mainstream federal courts and
procedure scholars would reject my imagined different result in Erie on similar grounds. After
seventy years of Erie, it is simply too difficult for mainstream lawyers to imagine a different result
in the case once Swi v. Tyson was displaced. But this alternative Erie holding hardly seems more
strained than judicial efforts to convert state procedural rules to substantive law as did the Gasperini
majority and the Shady Grove dissent. Ironically, another case of federal common law cited by
Professor Wright involved railroad liability and the Court's invocation of federal common law to
apply a substantive rule more protective of the railroad. See Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445
(1948) (holding that application of pre-Erie federal common law cases providing that passengers
riding free on railroad are entitled to recover for injury only in cases of gross negligence, overriding
Utah state law providing for liability in event of ordinary negligence for injuries to such
passengers). Francis is discussed in WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 60.
194. See, e.g., TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2 , at ch. 5 (presenting positive or at least non-
critical view of Erie concept even if noting problems or criticisms of Erie doctrine in operation);
968 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:907
HeinOnline  -- 44 Akron L. Rev. 968 2011
Consequently, federal courts are likely to remain in the business of
occasionally applying some wrong-headed state substantive laws in
diversity jurisdiction cases. Despite the arguable net resulting increase
in application of disfavored law, Erie greatly reduces instances of
disparate federal-state outcomes. Although Plaintiff Tompkins was
stripped of a $30,000 jury verdict,'9 5 he was accorded the substantive
"protection" of Pennsylvania state law, such as it was. Arguably this
was all to which he was entitled once one disregards the accident of
diversity jurisdiction.196
Despite the seeming command of Erie, one can make a strong
argument that deference to state substantive law need not mean servility
or overly expansive application. Where a state law is unwise, federal
courts would do well to be sure that it is truly sufficiently substantive for
its application to be commanded by Erie. Where legislation is the
product of haste, misinformation, or unduly narrow interest group
power, or where there is little evidence of public support or strong public
benefit, courts can legitimately take a restrained view in applying the
problematic law unless the law clearly qualifies as substantive for
purposes of Erie. Where aggressive application of the state law is in
tension with applicable federal law or policy, this logically counsels for
some restraint in the use of functionalism to deem state procedural rules
substantive rules of decision in disguise.
Shady Grove presented this type of situation. Consequently, the
dissent's great deference to § 901(b) and hailing of it as an example of
public-regarding compromise and consensus seems in error. Unlike the
standard for testing the excessiveness of jury awards at issue in
Gasperini, the penalty limitation does not appear to meet mainstream
JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 2.36-2.39 (same, although displaying more sympathy for Swift v.
Tyson and its rationale); WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 54-60 (same).
195. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. According to the popular online service, The Inflation
Calculator, $30,000 in 1938 dollars would be $452,096.25 in 2009 dollars. Although this is a
substantial amount, it may have actually undervalued the seriousness of his injury and disability.
See infra note 196.
196. Tompkins may also have been something less than blameless in the matter. He was
walking along the railroad footpath during the wee hours after a night of apparently extensive
drinking, raising the prospect that he wandered upon or too close to the railroad track. See Irving
Younger, Observation: What Happened in Erie, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1011 (1978). A jury faced with
the prevailing contributory negligence doctrine of the time (in both federal and state courts) had to
choose between giving Tompkins nothing or an award consistent with the degree of his injuries
rather than apportioning the award to account for any comparative negligence. In the aftermath of
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Tompkins "died severely disabled and destitute." See SUBRIN
ET AL., supra note 2, at 827 (citing Bob Rizzi, Erie Memoirs Reveal Drama, Tragedy, 63 HARV. L.
RECORD, Sept. 24, 1976, at 2).
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law reform concerns that animated CPLR § 5501. Faced with the Shady
Grove situation and the legal, but arguably tarnished status of § 901(b),
one might engage in a more realistic and critical analysis of § 901(b)'s
birth and legitimacy and conclude that § 901(b) is simply too ill-thought
and insufficiently examined to count as important state law and policy
entitled to deference sufficient to displace otherwise applicable federal
law in the form of Federal Rule 23. Or one might engage in a different,
less politically cynical analysis of § 901(b) such as that found in Justice
Stevens's Shady Grove concurrence and conclude that without regard to
the quality of § 901(b)'s underlying analysis, it is too insufficient an
expression of state substantive legal policy to displace an otherwise
clearly applicable federal procedural rule.
Both of these approaches incur the cost of committing the evaluator
to substantial examination of state lawmaking and public policy and
carry the risk of inconsistent or inaccurate assessments shaped by the
values of the assessor, who may like or dislike the legislation and,
through the magic of functionalism, now is given greater opportunity to
apply personal preferences to the assessment of case situations. Even if
the process costs of extensive judicial assessment of state law are
manageable, there exist significant deliberation costs as jurists will
undoubtedly differ as to the wisdom of state legislation and the
deference to which it is entitled once one looks behind text. I find §
901(b) an appallingly bad provision enacted hastily on the basis of
shallow, unsubstantiated, and incorrect contentions by vested interests.
Others may deem it a wise response to the potential evils of class
certification and its potential for litigation blackmail.
Under these circumstances, the formalist route of Justice Scalia's
Shady Grove plurality has much to recommend it as a means of avoiding
judicial debate over the background and merits of state legislation as
well as a means of lowering adjudication costs and conserving judicial
resources. Although formalism also provides plenty of opportunity for
judges to silently inject personal preferences into the analysis, it can,
when applied fairly, have a simplifying and discretion-suppressing
effect. And in Erie matters, somewhat less judicial opportunity for
discretion may be a fair price to pay for greater efficiency, predictability,
certainty, and avoidance of evaluation of the nature of litigation than
obtains when justices look behind state procedural rules to locate and
evaluate their substantive content.
Shady Grove provides a good illustration of the benefits of such
reasonable formalism for Erie questions. By looking almost solely at the
applicable scope of a Federal Rule of Procedure, the Scalia plurality
970 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:907
HeinOnline  -- 44 Akron L. Rev. 970 2011
avoids both the logistical costs of sustained examination of § 901(b), its
derivation, its place in the constellation of New York substantive law,
and its relative importance to the state body politic. Although this can
perhaps permit decisions that ride roughshod over strong state interests
embedded within a procedural rule or code, this almost certainly was not
the case in Shady Grove. The New York legislature wanted New York
law to largely mirror Federal Rule 23. Widely followed federal case law
applying Federal Rule 23 resisted class action treatment of statutory
penalty claims. The application of Federal Rule 23 to a case validly in
federal court rather than use of § 901(b) does little or no violence to New
York public policy and is hardly unfair to defendant Allstate,
particularly if there is any truth to plaintiffs allegations of intentional
foot-dragging in paying for medical services to insured accident victims.
Unexpectedly but importantly, the formalism of the Shady Grove
plurality also would logically have the beneficial effect of prompting
states to more often engage in greater scrutiny of procedural rules and
the policies imbedded in them. It may also prompt states to more often
determine for themselves whether the policies are of such importance
that they merit codification in the state's obviously substantive statutes
in order to avoid the reach of the Federal Rules envisioned by Justice
Scalia and his allies on the Court.
A state law capping damages appears to be state substantive law
that must apply under the Erie doctrine. But where a limitation upon
recovery is not set forth in a substantive statute but is instead bound with
the state's procedural rules, there is not only greater Erie conflict but
also greater difficulty ascertaining the degree to which the limitation is
substantive or procedural and whether it implicates the important state
policies to which Justices Harlan and Stevens sought to be sensitive.
But if the Shady Grove plurality approach becomes the Court's
established approach to Erie problems, state political actors going
forward will be required to establish their substantive legal regime with
greater clarity.197
Consider the issue of limitations on penalty class actions. If New
York had introduced this as a stand-alone piece of legislation to
accompany the 1975 class action bill or as a revision or corrective of the
197. See Hendricks, supra note 17, at 58 ("[U]niform federal procedure will allow states to
formulate substantive policy with knowledge of the procedures through which they will be enforced
and will encourage state lawmakers to act openly through the substantive law rather than
manipulated outcomes with special procedures."). See generally Symposium, Democracy and the
Courts: Judicial Selection, Legal Literacy, and the Role of Public Opinion, 61 HASTINGS L. J.
1333-1501 (2010).
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law, this hypothetical legislation would have likely enjoyed separate
reporting by the press and at least some consideration by the public at
large. The bill would have likely required separate hearings and invited
more reflective and substantive debate by the various interests
comprising the body politic. There would have been at least a chance at
some reasoned debate over the efficacy of penalties as enforcement tools
in the absence of class treatment and the actual degree to which
aggregation of penalty claims posed fair or unfair risks of large
judgments and defendant ability to pay them. The issue of class action
coercion would also perhaps have gotten a more serious examination
than it has traditionally enjoyed.
In the post-Shady Grove real world, the plurality's approach
arguably has already opened this possibility. New York political actors
reading Shady Grove now have a roadmap should they wish to make a
limitation on statutory penalty class actions impregnable against Federal
Rule 23 attack in cases that reach federal court through the accidents of
CAFA and diversity jurisdiction. They can re-enact § 901(b) as a
substantive law. Although the technical details of such a response to
Shady Grove are of course more complex than I am making them sound
(or have time to discuss in this article), this type of state "overruling" of
an adverse Erie decision with which the state disagrees is eminently
possible. But to date, there appears to have been no effort in New York
to overcome Shady Grove and ensure that Insurance Law § 5106 or other
state penalty statutes never again gain class action treatment in federal
court.
This may simply reflect legislative inertia and the timing, as New
York has not yet had its first post-Shady Grove legislative session. Or it
might reflect acquiescence or lack of concern, either of which would
vindicate the Shady Grove plurality and concurrence while undermining
the dissent's argument that application of Federal Rule 23 has done
some sort of real violence to the concept of federalism embodied in Erie
jurisprudence.
Additionally, the plurality's formalism and occasional forcing of
legislatures to re-examine state policy woven into state procedural
provisions can also have the beneficial effect of forcing state legislatures
to review and perhaps update these types of laws. The 1975 New York
legislation was by all accounts a positive and important law
notwithstanding what I regard as the wrong turn taken (with minimal
transparency) in § 901(b). But much has happened during the past
thirty-five years regarding attitudes toward the class action and
consumer protection generally. Today's New York legislature might opt
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for something quite different than Federal Rule 23, perhaps constraining
class actions beyond the limitations of federal law or § 901(b). A return
to pre-1975 state law is not beyond question.
Although I would disagree with any of these class-limiting laws as
a matter of my own substantive preferences, these decisions are of
course for New York to make-so long as it makes these decisions as
part of its substantive rules of decision for adjudicated cases and as part
of the state's articulation of the substantive rights and duties of its
citizenry, rather than encasing such choices in state procedural codes
that conflict with the Federal Civil Rules. By forcing substantive bars to
litigation into a state's substantive law, the approach of the Shady Grove
plurality can serve as a de facto spur for government "in the sunshine"
with more open focus on the merits of public policy issues and less low
visibility legislation "hidden" in the state's procedural laws.
To the extent states continue to put arguably substantive law into
procedural codes, these provisions "deserve" to be displaced by on-point
federal rules in cases properly in federal court. At some point, the
Sibbach-Byrd-Hanna-Shady Grove line of cases must stand for the
proposition that the tail of odd state procedural provisions or practices
cannot wag the federal litigation dog and that federal judges are not mere
"ventriloquist's dummies" forced to mouth state law despite having a
thick batch of applicable federal rules.
The Sibbach-Hanna-Shady Grove analysis is particularly apt where
problematic state law is embedded in procedural rule covering the same
territory as does a federal civil rule. These cases truly do not present the
relatively unguided Erie choice of York or similar cases. When a rule of
federal procedure is enacted, the federal judiciary and its constituents
(lawyers, scholars, government agencies, litigants, public policy interest
groups) have spoken, as has the Supreme Court, with Congress giving at
least tacit support or at the very least not disagreeing sufficiently to
interfere. At this point, great deference should be given to applying the
federal rule in federal court actions. This deference can logically be
overcome by a clear showing that state controlling substantive law is to
the contrary.
Further, Shady Grove involved CAFA jurisdiction, an area where
Congress spoke strongly regarding its desire to provide a federal forum
for certain types of class actions. Although many CAFA proponents
would undoubtedly be unpleasantly surprised at the pro-plaintiff
outcome in Shady Grove, which permitted doctors to sue an insurer via
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the class device,198 this arguably only underscores the benefits of
formalist adherence to validly promulgated federal rules and statutes.
Result orientation is forced to take a back seat to playing by the federal
procedural rules in the federal litigation arena. For that reason, the
concern for vindicating federal policy in Byrd is also enhanced by the
Shady Grove approach and outcome.199 At some point, the deference to
state legislation reflected in the Shady Grove dissent is likely to have
negative implications for the ability of federal courts to run themselves.
When in doubt as to the degree the scope of federal procedural rules and
the degree of federal-state rules conflict, the federal rule should govern.
In addition to working well in Shady Grove and forcing greater
democratic deliberation in the states-at least if they want their
substantive policies to resist displacement by federal rules in federal
courts - the plurality's approach appears reasonable for use in future Erie
cases. It is sufficiently consistent with key Erie precedents, other than
perhaps Gasperini, although it too, can be reconciled with Shady Grove
in light of the lack of codified federal standards governing the vacating
of excessive jury awards. Applying Shady Grove rather than Gasperini
going forward would require minimal federalism costs in return for gains
in protection of federal procedural prerogatives, simplicity,
predictability, and efficiency. Gasperini, it should be recalled, displaced
Federal Rule 59 with CPLR § 5501 through a bit of straw man sleight of
hand in that the Gasperini majority described the federal standard for
assessing the excessiveness of jury verdicts as whether the verdict
"shocks the conscience" of the court. This unguided homage to judicial
gut feeling was contrasted with the seemingly more rational New York
198. See Burbank, supra note 47 (CAFA "resulted from years of intense lobbying" by various
interest groups and was part of "a trio of 'tort reform' measures sought by the Bush administration,"
although the resulting statute may be "inimical to the interests" of many tort reform advocates);
Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision, supra note 99, at 1142-48 (discussing background of
CAFA and legislative intend to tame perceived abusive class actions, particularly those brought in
state courts). Shady Grove suggests more than a little prescience in Professor Burbank's
observation.
199. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (determining that where
suit is in federal court on basis of diversity jurisdiction, issue of whether injured lineman was
independent contractor (rather than employee) and thus outside scope of South Carolina workers
compensation law and its limitations on damage awards subject to jury determination
notwithstanding state practice because of strong federal policy favoring jury determination of
disputed facts). Byrd, of course, is correctly decided, but would have been simpler, more direct, and
more satisfying if the Court had simply stated that in federal court, the Seventh Amendment governs
the availability of the jury, period. The Seventh Amendment in my view operates as something of a
"super" Federal Civil Rule and where on point displaces contrary state practice regarding the
allocation of the factfinding function at trial.
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law, that allowed setting aside of a jury verdict where the verdict
"materially deviates" from reasonable precedent. 200
Although the federal reporters are strewn with plenty of precedent
using the "shocks the conscience" language,201 anyone who has ever
practiced in federal court knows that a jury verdict is in great danger of
being set aside as against the weight of the evidence if the presiding
federal trial judge views the amount awarded as unreasonable. Federal
district judges do not need to be "shocked" to intervene in such
situations. Their desire to prevent unreasonable compensation is
reflected in numerous decisions. 02
By any reasonable understanding of language, an "against the
weight of the evidence" standard presents a lower bar to ordering a new
trial than a "shocks the conscience" test. By suggesting that only where
the trial judge was aghast or amazed by the size of the verdict could
there be a new trial, the Gasperini majority presented a misleading
200. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 425 (1996).
201. See, e.g., Eich v. Board of Regents, Central Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 763-64 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding that for new trial, the verdict must shock the conscience of court; a new trial
requires a "monstrous" or "shocking" result). See JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. & LEUBSDORF, supra
note 2, § 7.29 (noting existence of shock-the-conscience review of verdict size, but also noting
modem trend toward greater supervision of jury verdicts); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 45, § 59.13[2][g][B] (stating that "[i]n a federal question case, a district court will ordinarily
deem an award excessive it if 'shocks the judicial conscience."' (footnoted omitted)). However, an
examination of the footnote's supporting cases suggests that something far less than shock is
sufficient for at least some federal courts to deem a verdict excessive and to order a new trial. See,
e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (establishing that punitive damages
are subject to review pursuant to Due Process Clause and finding $4 million punitive damages
award remitted to $2 million for misrepresentation about touched up paint job on car "grossly
excessive," but eschewing shock-the-conscience rhetoric); McCoy v. Goldberg, 810 F. Supp. 539,
542 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding a court may overturn verdict that is "grossly excessive").
202. See, e.g., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 45, § 59.13[2][f] & [g] (stating courts
routinely order new trials where verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or is "entirely
disproportionate" to plaintiff's injury); TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at 963 (stating courts
commonly order new trials where a jury verdict is "excessive"); JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. &
LEUBSDORF, supra note 2, § 7.29; 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2806 (2d ed. 1995) (stating federal courts routinely order new trials when
verdict is against the weight of the evidence).
In a case Professors James, Hazard and Leubsdorf describe as summarizing "well" the
prevailing federal test, the court stated that when facing a Federal Rule 59 new trial motion "it is the
duty of the trial judge to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, if he is of the opinion that the
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence . .. even though there may be substantial evidence
which would prevent the direction of a verdict." Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350,
352-53 (4th Cir. 1941), and quoted in JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. & LEUBSDORF, supra note 2, at 474.
Although the Yeatts test is typically associated with ordering a new trial because the judge
thought that the prevailing party should not have obtained a favorable verdict, its logic applies to
review of verdict size as well as verdict direction and suggests that federal courts prior to Gasperini
were not waiting for jaw-droppingly absurd jury verdicts as a prerequisite to granting a new trail.
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picture of actual federal court practice and modest or nonexistent degree
to which it differed from New York's articulated new trial standard.
Consequently, had Gasperini been decided the other way, applying
Federal Rule 59 rather than CPLR § 5501 to a photographer's suit for
lost photographs, his initial jury verdict of $450,000 would almost
certainly have been set aside for a new trial. The $100,000 remittitur
imposed under the New York new trial standard also sounds very much
within the range of likely federal outcomes for new trial motions in cases
of this type.
In addition to perhaps reflecting the dearth of trial court experience
on the Gasperini Court (where not a single Justice had served as a trial
judge and few had been federal trial attorneys), an unfortunate
demographic continued with the current Court (where only Justice
Sotomayor has served as a trial judge)203 Gasperini, like the Shady
Grove dissent, arguably reflects excessive concern with attempting to
achieve maximum congruence in federal and state trial outcomes. The
concern is misplaced for two reasons.
First, modest differences between federal and state courts are a
necessary cost of federalism. Erie "hawks" - those who give the most
limited reach to federal procedural rules - wrongly see federalism in this
context as unvarying equivalence. But federalism also entails accepting
some degree of difference between the two systems, just as state-to-state
differences are accepted as a cost of doing business in American
government and law.
Second, and perhaps more important and certainly more inarguable,
a quest for intra-court symmetry is doomed to failure and inconsistent
with the inevitable differences in case outcomes that the legal system is
forced to embrace as a concession to reality. The differences between
state and federal law in Erie questions, although sometimes large, are
often relatively modest when compared to the inevitable differences that
result when the system allows adjudication by different lay jurors
presided over by different judges with litigants of different attractiveness
203. See, e.g., DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 2010)
(providing biographies of all justices that indicate lack of trial court experience for all members of
Shady Grove Court except Justice Sotomayor); ROGER K. NEWMAN, THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW (2009) (providing short biographies of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, and Thomas that reflect lack of trial court experience); BIOGRAPHICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE LIVES AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE JUSTICES
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006) (same regarding all members of Shady Grove Court except Justice
Sotomayor); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit
L. Hall, James W. Ely, Jr. & Joel B. Grossman eds., 2005) (same).
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and resources (but essentially the same type of legal claims and injuries)
represented by different attorneys of varying skills and support.
As noted above, Mr. Gasperini's initially large jury verdict was
imperiled under either federal or New York new trial standards. As also
illustrated by cases such as Ratner v. Chemical Bank, federal trial courts
possess sufficient power to prevent unduly unwieldy or coercive class
actions sufficient to harmonize outcomes in these cases with the
prohibition of § 901(b). Compare this to everyday events in litigation
for which there is no Erie intervention: One plaintiff is awarded $1
million for accident-related pain and suffering while a similarly situated
plaintiff in another court receives nothing or a much lower award. One
defendant wins via summary judgment during the early stages of
litigation while a second's motion is narrowly denied, leading to a trial
and imposition of multi-million dollar liability.
In a nation as large and diverse as the United States, much
variegation in litigation outcomes is unavoidable, a reality that counsels
against federal courts being too skittish about applying federal procedure
merely because of its potential for differences with state court outcomes.
To be sure, straight up or hard core differences in substantive law, as
existed in Erie itself, require deference to the state substantive law. But
such deference is hardly so essential in the murkier realm of the
questions posed in Hanna, Gasperini, and Shady Grove. Arguably
Ragan and Walker fall into this category as well even though the Court
in both cases was solidly behind deference to the state rule in question.
In cases like Byrd, which implicate the federal constitution (specifically
the Seventh Amendment), there should be even less concern that
application of federal practice runs afoul of the Erie concept merely
because there may be a different outcome had the matter been in state
court.
The waters of Erie will never be crystal clear in this regard. But
navigating them can be far simpler and more expeditious under the
Shady Grove plurality approach, needing only some occasional
leavening from the Harlan/Stevens functionalist search for important
state interests in the closer cases. If nothing else, however, the Shady
Grove saga suggests that there is an additional benefit to the plurality's
more formalist, Sibbach and aggressive Hanna approach in that it can
force state lawmaking more into the open, encouraging greater and more
reflective debate about and scrutiny of policy decisions.
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V. CONCLUSION
A narrow, brittle formalism usually makes for unsatisfactory
jurisprudence. When coupled with primitive, hyperliteral textualism or
reductionist presentations of a complex world, it can lead to bizarre
results at odds with legislative intent, contracting intent, citizen
understanding, and common sense. But formalism has its place in the
law's analytic arsenal. If not excessively narrow and fundamentalist,
adherence to a formalist approach, like Ulysses now famous decision to
have himself lashed to the mast to avoid responding to the Sirens'
Song,204 may save the courts not only from greater investment of
adjudication resources but also may act as a modest impetus for
government "in the sunshine" by forcing more public and separate
consideration of serious policy issues that might otherwise get short
shrift when appended to, or interwoven with, procedural legislation. To
the extent that a state proceeds to cloth substantive legal entitlements or
immunities in procedural garb, it is far less likely to avoid federal
procedural pre-emption in federal court litigation if the Shady Grove
plurality approach holds in future cases. Notwithstanding the academy's
general preference for functionalism and the jurisprudence of Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Harlan over formalism and the jurisprudence of
Justice Scalia, Shady Grove shows the occasional virtues of formalism
properly applied.
204. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (1984) (providing a prominent recounting of the Ulysses story by a philosopher to
illustrate potential benefits of establishing pre-existing constraints on decisionmaking). As of
December 2010, Elster's use of the Ulysses analogy had been cited more than 300 times in the law
review literature while the Ulysses and the Sirens episode has been cited more than 400 times.
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